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Article

Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials:
A Role for Conspiracy Law
in International Tribunals
Richard P. Barrettt and Laura E. Littlett
In landmark decisions developing international humanitarian law of sexual violence and enslavement, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) handed
down several convictions for mass rape of women during conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.1 International scholars, critics,
advocates, and other thinkers have lauded the architects of the
Yugoslav tribunal for making possible these successful prosecutions of rape and other sexual offenses against women. Much
energy has focused on analyzing how the substantive and procedural rules governing the rape prosecutions were sufficiently
t Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Adjunct Professor, Temple University's Beasley School of Law.
Copyright © 2003 Richard P. Barrett.
tt Professor of Law and James E. Beasley Chair in Law, Temple University's Beasley School of Law. Copyright © 2003 Laura E. Little.
We are grateful for the encouragement and comments of Professors Roger
Clark and JoAnne Epps. We also acknowledge the extraordinary research assistance of Steven Freedman. The views expressed in this Article are solely
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Department of Justice or any other institution.
1. Perhaps the most heralded decision concerned three ethnic Serbians,
convicted in March 2001 for their abuse of women at a "rape camp" near a
small Bosnian town named Foca. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23T, IT-96-23/1-T, para. 858 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial
Chamber Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.un.orglicty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01022e.pdf, afFd Case Nos. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber June 12, 2002), at http://www.un.org/
icty/foca/appeal/judgment/kun-aj020612e.pdf. Earlier cases also involved rape
prosecutions within the context of other atrocities, although the rapes were
not as central to the prosecutions as in Kunarac. See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia
Appeals Chamber July 21, 2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/
appeal/judgement/fur-aj00072 le.pdf.
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broad and robust as to treat the crimes with the grave seriousness they deserve, but have not always received, within the
context of war. Likewise, those studying the subject of rape as a
war crime have trumpeted the benefits of prosecution in an
international-rather than domestic-forum, with particular
emphasis on an international tribunal's ability to maintain victim confidentiality, to attain a level of impartiality not possible
in the unsettled domestic arena, and to express world condemnation of the crime.2
As important as the ICTY convictions have been, equally
important for the future are the failures to prosecute and the
acquittals of rape crimes. For example, the commander of a
special reconnaissance unit of the Bosnian Serb Army,
Dragoljub Kunarac, was acquitted of responsibility as a superior for rape crimes committed by persons under his authority.3
Other individuals whose indictments and trials suggested
greater individual responsibility for rape crimes were not convicted on the basis that they were not responsible for the
actions of the soldiers they command.4
Given the unstructured and chaotic nature of the Yugoslav
conflict, it is not surprising that the tribunal was unsatisfied
with the proof that Kunarac and individuals like him were
actually commanding subordinate soldiers at the time of the
alleged crimes.5 The guerrilla quality of the war and the con-

2. Scholars have also started to scrutinize the evidentiary and procedural rules followed by the Yugoslav tribunal and to analyze how these rulesin conjunction with the other benefits of the international tribunal-made
possible the convictions handed down. Indeed, the evidentiary and procedural
rules followed by the ICTY are markedly more favorable to the prosecution
than those in place in many domestic legal systems. See infra note 10 for further discussion of the particular importance of maintaining balanced principles of substance and procedure within the international criminal law context.
3. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, at para. 629.
4. For other individuals acquitted of command responsibility for rapes
that occurred, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A,
paras. 268, 313 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber
Feb. 20, 2001) (affirming the acquittals for command responsibility of Zejnil
Delalic, a high-level Bosnian Muslim military commander with no direct
authority over the Celebici camp, and Hazim Delic, a Bosnian Muslim deputy
commander of the Celebici camp who was found not to have command responsibility for the prison guards at the camp), at http://www.un.org/icty/
celebicilappeal/judgement/cel-aj010220.pdf.
5. See Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, at para. 628 (holding that the proof failed to show that "the soldiers who committed the
offences in the indictment were under the effective control of Kunarac at the
time they committed the offences"); see also Kelly D. Askin, News from the
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fused hierarchy of various military and quasi-military organizations participating create ambiguity in the lines of authority
and in causes for soldiers' actions.' In light of the often loose
military structure in modern wars, one would expect the command responsibility theory to fail repeatedly not only in other
cases arising from the Yugoslav conflict, but also in cases arising from atrocities occurring in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, and
in matters that are eventually brought before the International
Criminal Court (ICC). The likely precedential effect of ICTY
decisions in ICC proceedings should be a major concern motivating scholars and practitioners to understand obstacles to
7
criminal liability in ICTY cases.
Command responsibility is a symbolic and important
option for convicting high profile leaders associated with wartime atrocities. Where convictions are unattainable for lack of
proof, however, this symbolic role is not fulfilled. Acquittals of
important figures "impair the inhibitory effect of international
justice on those whom it is most important to deter."8 Indeed,
the acquittal in Kunarac is particularly significant because the
case represents essentially the first international rape prosecution since the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.9 The appropriate
response is not necessarily to expand the reach of command
responsibility. The ICTY and other international tribunals that
read command responsibility provisions rigorously and restrictively are upholding international criminal law's important
commitment to convictions based on individual culpability,
rather than collective guilt.1"
InternationalCriminal Tribunals:Part IV-ICTY (2001), 8 HUM. RTS. BIEF.
20, 22 (2001) (discussing the Kunarac acquittal for command responsibility).
6. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for further discussion of

the structure of the organizations participating in the conflict.
7. See Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute:
Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625,
629 (2001) (noting that reliance on the Yugoslav and Rwanda ad hoc tribunals
"was visible and often persuasive throughout the ICC negotiations"); Sanja
Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 258 (2001) (arguing that the ICTY's
work will likely serve as precedent in subsequent international decisionmaking bodies).
8. Mirjan Dama~ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 471 (2001).
9. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HANDS OF VENGEANCE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 258 (2000).
10.

See NORMAN CIGAR & PAUL WILLIAMS, INDICTMENT AT THE HAGUE:

THE MILOSOvIC REGIME AND THE CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR 30 n.7 (2002)

(noting that "[tihe need to establish individual responsibility in order to avoid
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That is not to say, however, that wartime leaders do not
merit prosecution and punishment for their involvement in
plans to perpetuate rape. In fact, the ICTY has developed and
applied a theory of liability-which the tribunal calls "joint
criminal enterprise" liability-that often makes convictions
possib le where command responsibility or direct individual
responsibility might fall short." This Article explores yet
another important substantive law option for pursuing that
end: expanded use of conspiracy law to capture those who promoted, but did not necessarily commit, systematic rapes. Conspiracy law can not only compensate for command responsibility's shortcomings, but can also satisfy the need for direct
criminal responsibility for wrongdoing. As such, conspiracy law
can negotiate a calibrated balance, avoiding purely vicarious
liability for the criminal acts of others while imposing independent criminal liability for preliminary actions forming crucial foundations for widespread criminality. Conspiracy law
also enables prosecution of multiple defendants-thus expanding the reach of war crimes tribunals' work and thereby reinforcing their deterrent, retributive, and educative functions. 2
Because of its status as an independent crime, conspiracy law
allows this expanded reach without threatening the respect for
fairness and individual responsibility that undergirds international criminal law. 13 At the same time, conspiracy also proconclusions of collective guilt has been highlighted by both the United Nations
Secretary-General and the Chief Prosecutor" for the ICTY); see also Dama~ka,
supra note 8, at 456 (arguing that a broad reading of command responsibility
can be inconsistent with notions of individual culpability).
11. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvoka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, paras. 284-93
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 2, 2001) (outlining the principles of joint criminal enterprise), at http://www.un.org.icty/
kvocka/trialc/judgement/kvo-tjOl 1002e.pdf.
12. See Developments in the Law-International Criminal Law, 114
HARv. L. REV. 1947, 1962-74 (2001) [hereinafter Developments] (reviewing the
proffered purposes behind ICTY prosecutions including incapacitation, deterrence, moral education, rule of law, retribution, restorative justice, and historiographic accuracy).
13. International war crimes tribunals are remarkable in their treatment
of humankind's most horrific criminals in accordance with orderly procedures.
Bound to this commitment to the rule of law is the risk that not guilty verdicts
will result and the criminals will not be punished. It is therefore somewhat
ironic that the justice dispensed within the international tribunals-although
in large part designed to protect the rights of victims-is sometimes less solicitous of defendants and occasionally structured as to make convictions more
likely. Cf Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminal Courts and Fair Trials:
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 112 (2002) (observing that

ordinary political roles are switched in the war crimes context, with the politi-
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vides a robust alternative to joint enterprise liability.
While arguments about conspiracy and command responsibility are important to understanding prosecutions of many
crimes in diverse international contexts, we explore them here
primarily through the lens of rape crimes, searching for lessons
useful in prosecutions pursuant to the Rome Statute creating
the ICC. This Article begins by reviewing the basic skeleton of
the ICTY statute making possible broader prosecution for conspiracy to rape and observes how the Trial and Appeals Chambers have broadly interpreted the joint criminal liability provisions of the statute to include joint criminal enterprise, a
theory of criminality that resembles, but does not duplicate,
conspiracy. Because much language of the ICTY statute tracks
provisions from other international law contexts (most notably
the ICC statute), this statutory analysis provides guidance
beyond the Yugoslav context. We review limitations and problems with command responsibility as a means of prosecuting
proponents of mass rape as an instrument of war, genocide, and
inhumane treatment. With this background, we analyze conspiracy as a prosecutorial theory, arguing that conspiracy's
focus on an agreement among perpetrators is well suited to
past experience with prosecuting widespread, systematic rape.
Finally, we gaze into the future, outlining whether the ICC's
structure is suited to conspiracy as an alternative to command
responsibility or joint criminal enterprise liability and identifying legal issues needing further refinement.
I. THE ICTY STATUTE: SEX CRIMES
AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
An analysis of the avenues available in the ICTY statute
for pursuing architects of systematic rape raises two broad

cal left tending to favor potent tribunals and the political right opposing such

tribunals, or at least the ICC).
It is indeed important for the ICTY and other contemporary tribunals to

dodge the criticism that the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals had been unfair
manifestations of "victors' justice." For discussion of this perspective on the
Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals, see Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to The
Hague, in WAR CRIMES COMES OF AGE 198 (Oxford 1998) and RICHARD H.
MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971). See also
Developments, supra note 12, at 1982-2006 (analyzing whether the ICTY
escapes the allegation of unfair treatment for defendants). Given the unprecedented and symbolic nature of the rape convictions-and their likely influence
on jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court-these observations are
particularly important.
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questions about the statute: How, and to what extent, does the
statute authorize prosecution of sex crimes? Do the parameters
of individual criminal responsibility include conspiracy along
with command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise
liability?
A. SEXUAL ASSAULT

Crimes prohibited under the ICTY statute divide into four
substantive categories: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide,
and crimes against humanity. On its face, the statute explicitly
mentions sexual assault only as a crime against humanity. 14 In
Article 3, a nonexhaustive list of violations of the laws and customs of war permits the direct criminalization and prosecution
of rape. In practice, the ICTY recognizes that rape prosecutions
can be pursued not as an enumerated crime itself, but as an
element (usually actus reus) of the four crime categories.' 5 The
Yugoslav tribunal has defined rape to require actual penetration of the victim's mouth, anus, or vagina, although it has
acknowledged that international criminal rules punish "any
serious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration." 6

14. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 5(g), 32 I.L.M. 1192-94,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/badic/statut/stat2000.htm, adopted by S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 172
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Dec. 10, 1998) (stating
that the prosecution of rape authorized explicitly "in Article 5 of the Statute of
the International Tribunal as a crime against humanity" may also be punished
as "a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws of customs of war or an act of genocide, if the requisite elements are met"), at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/j udgementfur-tj981210e.pdf,
affd,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals
Chamber July 21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/
appeal/judgement/fur-aj000721e.pdf; see also Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru
Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 57 (1997) (describing the prosecution theory).

16. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, at para. 186. The Trial Chamber
has stated that the objective elements of rape include:
(i) the sexual penetration, however, slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third
person.
Id. at para. 185.
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B. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
1.

Statutory Language

Article 7 of the ICTY statute authorizes command responsibility for each of the categories of substantive offenses set
forth in the statute. Specifically, the statute provides that a
superior should bear criminal responsibility "if he knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit [violations] or had done so" under circumstances where "the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof." 7 The
Kunarac prosecutor unsuccessfully joined this provision in a
rape prosecution."
Article 7 also authorizes accomplice liability, providing for
individual responsibility for all four broad categories of substantive offenses for persons "who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of' the offense.' 9 The tribunal has not
hesitated to use this section with rape prosecutions. An example is the 1998 conviction of Bosnian Croat paramilitary chief
Anto Furundzija for rape as an outrage against personal dignity. Although Furundzija was an acknowledged local commander, 0 aiding and abetting, rather than command responsibility, formed the foundation for his criminal liability.2 '
Reasoning that the ICTY statute prohibits "the planning,
ordering or instigating ... [of rape] as well as aiding and
abetting in the perpetration,"22 the Trial Chamber found aiding
and abetting liability because Furundzija, as a superior, was
present during the rape of a woman; interrogated her before,

17. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1).
18. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, para. 858
(Int'l Crim. Trib for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Feb 22, 2001), at
http://www.un.orgicty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kun-tjOlO22e.pdf,
affd Case
Nos. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals
Chamber June 12, 2002), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/appeal/judgement/
kun-aj020612e.pdf.
19. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1).
20. Furundzija,Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, at para. 40.
21. Id. at para. 274.
22. Id. at para. 187. In such situations, "the fellow perpetrator plays a role
every bit as grave as the person who actually inflicts the pain and suffering."
Id. at para. 281; see also Kate Nahapetian, Selective Justice:ProsecutingRape
in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 126, 132 (1999).
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during, and after the rapes; and encouraged the rapes. 23 The
Appeals Chamber endorsed this approach, affirming
Furundzija's liability as co-perpetrator of the rape.2 4
2. Accomplice Liability, Joint Criminal Enterprise,
and Conspiracy
Although Article 7 embraces accomplice liability, the article does not necessarily authorize conspiracy prosecutions.
Indeed, many see complicity and conspiracy as distinguishable
concepts, and this Article adopts that position. American hornbook law provides, for example, that "one is not an accomplice
to the crime merely because [a] crime was committed in furtherance of a conspiracy of which he is a member, or because
[the] crime was a natural and probable consequence of another
offense as to which he is an accomplice." 5 Moreover, .the26hallmark of conspiracy is agreement among co-conspirators
and
the ICTY crime definitions nowhere mention agreement. The
statute does mention conspiracy in connection with genocide in
Article 4, identifying "conspiracy to commit genocide" as a punishable act. 7 This of course raises the questions whether conspiracy is a crime reserved solely for acts of genocide, or, alternatively, whether prosecutors and judges of the ICTY should
ascribe no particular meaning to conspiracy's omission from
other contexts. The word may simply be an artifact of its earlier

23. Furundzija,Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, at paras. 266, 273-74.
24. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, para. 119 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 21, 2000), at
http://www.un.orglicty/furundzjia/judgement/fur-aj00072 le.pdf.
25. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 587 (2d
ed. 1986); see also SARAH N.WELLING ET AL., 1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO

§ 4.5 (1998) (stating that "federal courts treat membership in a criminal conspiracy as a specialized basis for accomplice liability for offenses committed by
other members of the conspiracy" and that "accomplice liability is established
if (1) the defendant was a member of a conspiracy, (2) a co-conspirator committed a substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) the offense
could be 'reasonably foreseen' as a 'necessary or natural consequence of the
unlawful agreement'") (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)).
26. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of conspiracy definitions.
27. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, at art. 4(3)(b). This reference in large
part derives from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. III, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
280 (1951), reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 263 (2000).
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use in the Genocide Convention. 8
Several commentators maintain that the ICTY statute
embraces conspiracy as a general theory of liability.2 9 One
writer even reasoned that the statute authorizes conspiracy
prosecutions, since "anyone who 'aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution' of a crime would, from the
common law point of view, be guilty of having participated in a
criminal conspiracy."3" Whatever the force of this reasoning, it
does not define the full scope of the statute's apparent embrace
of conspiracy law. The statute nowhere states that a war criminal could be held liable as a conspirator where his or her
co-conspirator independently committed an unplanned act that
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy's
purpose. Nonetheless, several Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions suggest that the statute is broad enough to authorize
liability under such circumstances, without clarifying whether
the ICTY views the statute as authorizing conspiracy liability
itself.
One of the earliest ICTY expositions on joint criminal
enterprise occurred in the Tadic case, involving the prosecution
28. Background materials on the Genocide Convention itself suggest that
conspiracy was included in the convention in order to recognize that, in view of
the highly serious nature of genocide, mere agreement to commit genocide
should be punishable even in the absence of a preparatory act. See Summary
Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21
September-10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly (discussed in Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 185 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Jan. 27, 2000) (attributing to the
Secretariat the statement that conspiracy is necessary to fulfill the preventative purposes of the Convention and was designed to include such acts as systematic propaganda designed to incite hatred), at http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/casesfMusemaljudgementlindex.htm, affd on other grounds, Case
No. ICTR-96-13-A, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Appeals Chamber Nov. 16,
2001), at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgementArrettindex.
htm).
29. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES, pt. 1, § VI(D) (1997) (stating that the

concept of "conspiracy" is recognized in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda statutes),
available at http://web.amnesty.orglibrary/index/ENGIOR40001997; Howard
S. Levie, The Statute of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia:
A Comparisonwith the Past and a Look to the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 1, 11 (1995) (pointing out the similarity between the ICTY statute and
Article 6 of the 1945 London Charter, which provided that individuals "participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any [defined criminal acts] are responsible for all acts performed by
any person in execution of such plan").
30. Levie, supra note 29, at 11 n.60 (quoting ICTY Statute, supra note 14,
at art. 7).
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of a relatively low level Bosnian Serb politician who participated in ethnic cleansing of the Prijedor area and in detention
camp abuses. Although Tadic was convicted of war crimes and
crimes against humanity for numerous violent incidents, the
Trial Chamber acquitted him of the murder of five men in the
village of Jaskici, concluding that no evidence established that
he was personally responsible for the crime,' Although Tadic
and his group had been seen in the village beating and seizing
various victims, no one could testify that Tadic executed them.32
The Appeals Chamber reversed, holding Tadic liable for murder because he "took part in the common criminal purpose to
rid [the Prijedor region] of the non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts," and because the killing of non-Serbs in
furtherance of this plan was a foreseeable outcome of which he
was aware. 33
In reaching this ruling, the Appeals Chamber derived from
customary international law three categories of joint activity
that could subject a perpetrator to liability for the acts of others.3 ' First are those cases in which all co-defendants, acting
pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal intention. For example, defendants may form a plan to kill with each
participant carrying out a different role, but nevertheless each
possessing the intent to kill.35 The Appeals Chamber derived a
second category of joint activity from World War II concentration camp cases, where members of military or administrative
units act pursuant to a concerted plan,3 6 each with the requisite
mental element deriving from "knowledge of the nature of the
system of ill-treatment and intent to further the common design of ill-treatment."3 7 A prosecutor can prove intent "either directly or as a matter of inference from the nature of the

31. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, paras. 371-73 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II May 7, 1997) at http://www.un.
org/icty/tadic/trialc2/udgementtad-tsj7O5O7JT2-e.pdf., affd, Case No. IT-941-A, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999),
at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgementltad-aj990715e.pdf.
32. Id. at para. 373.
33. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at paras. 231-33.
34. Id. at para. 220 (stating that the notion of common design as a form of
accomplice liability "is firmly established in customary international law and
in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of the International Tribunal").

35. Id. at para. 196.
36. Id. at para. 202.
37. Id. at para. 220.
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accused's authority within the camp or organizational hierarchy."" The most attenuated cases for joint criminal enterprise
liability are in a third category: offenses that do not necessarily
fall within a common plan or are not the object of a common
criminal purpose. Liability attaches if two factors are present:
(1) the accused possesses "the intention to take part in a joint
criminal enterprise and to further ...

the criminal purposes of

that enterprise" and (2) the offenses committed by members of
the group are foreseeable.39 Thus, if participants had the intent
to mistreat concentration camp prisoners and one of the prisoners died as a result of mistreatment, liability can attach to a
participant who was not actually involved in the mistreatment
40
so long as "everyone in the group [could] predict this result."
The tribunal's inclination to find a joint criminal enterprise
has its limitations.4 1 For example, the tribunal reasoned in one
case that the defendant's conduct did not constitute participation in a joint criminal enterprise because of the lack of shared
intent and the absence of agreement among the participants.
A useful exposition on complicity theories appears in the
Trial Chamber judgment of Radislav Krstic, a commander of
the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army, who was prosecuted
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the
laws and customs of war committed in the Srebrenica enclave
in July 1995. In addition to listing definitions for each statutory
component of individual criminal liability, 43 the Trial Chamber
38. Id. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber appeared to endorse the
notion that liability could attach because a person possessed a "position of authority," and "had the power to avoid unlawful treatment of others," but failed
to do anything to avoid that treatment. Id. at para 203.
39. Id. at para. 220.
40. Id.
41. See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, para. 127. (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II Mar. 15, 2002) (rejecting
the prosecution's theory that the defendant shared the intent of the joint
criminal enterprise related to offenses committed while he was warden of the
KP Dom prison camp), at http://www.un.org/icty/krnojelac/trialc2/judgement/
krn-tj020315e.pdf.
42. Id. at paras. 127, 170, 315, 346, 487.
43. The Trial Chamber summarized:
- "Planning" means that one or more persons design the commission
of a crime at both the preparatory and execution phases;
- "Instigating" means prompting another to commit an offence;
- "Aiding and abetting" means rendering a substantial contribution to
the commission of a crime; and
- "Joint criminal enterprise" liability is a form of criminal responsibil-
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explained in the Krstic judgment that joint criminal enterprise
liability includes three actus reus elements: (1) a "plurality of
persons"; (2) the "existence of a common plan," which amounts
to or involves the commission of the crimes listed in the ICTY
statute; and (3) participation in the "execution of the common
plan."" As for mens rea, the tribunal has stated that where a
crime falls within the joint criminal enterprise, "the prosecution must establish that the accused shared with the person
who personally perpetrated the crime the state of mind
required for that crime."" When, on the other hand, "the crime
charged went beyond the object of the joint criminal enterprise,
the prosecution needs to establish only that the accused was
aware that the further crime was a possible consequence in the
execution of that enterprise and that, with that awareness, he
participated in that enterprise."4 6
In Furundzija,the Appeals Chamber continued this broad
reading of co-perpetration in the context of a rape prosecution,
stating that criminal liability does not require a preexisting
plan or purpose.47 Instead, the "common plan or purpose may
materialize extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact
that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect a
joint criminal enterprise."48 The Furundzija Appeals Chamber
found this standard satisfied in the context described above:
One perpetrator interrogated a victim during the same period
in which another perpetrator raped her.49 Under such circumstances, the Appeals Chamber found proof of a common purpose because "the act of one accused contributed to the purpose
ity... implicitly included Article 7(1) of the Statute. It entails individual responsibility for participation in a joint criminal enterprise to
commit a crime.
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 601 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber August 2, 2001) (citing the findings of several
trial and appellate cases of the ICTY and ICTR for its summary), at

http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/trialcl/judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
44. Id. at para. 611 (citing Tadic, IT-94-1-A, at para 227).
45. Id. at para. 613 (quoting Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend at para. 31, Prosecutor v.
Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial
Chamber II June 26, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/decisione/10626FI215879.htm).

46. Id.; see also Decision, at para. 30, Brdjanin (No. IT-99-36).
47. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, para. 119 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 21, 2000), at
http://www.un.orglicty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/fur-aj00072 le.pdf.

48. Id. (quoting Tadic, Case No. 94-1-A, at para. 227).
49. Id. at para. 120.
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of the other, and both acted simultaneously, in the same place
and within full view of each other." °
These descriptions draw a picture difficult to distinguish
from conspiracy, which focuses on agreements to commit a
criminal act. One may even ask whether the ICTY treats proof
of a "common plan" as the same as proof of an agreement to
commit a crime. The Appeals Chamber's statement that a common purpose may materialize "extemporaneously" suggests
that a common plan is no more challenging to establish than a
conspiratorial agreement. Language in at least one ICTY opinion actually treats agreement and common plan as coextensive. Specifically, the Trial Chamber opinion states that the
prosecution failed to prove joint criminal enterprise because it
did not show that the accused "entered into ...an agreement"
to effect a crime. 52 Such reasoning suggests that the ICTY statute may in fact embrace conspiracy as a form of criminality
already recognized within Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions.
Domestic and international law materials, however, reveal
that conspiracy is analytically separate from complicity theories such as joint criminal enterprise liability. In accepting this
distinction, this Article defines conspiracy as common law
thinkers: an offense consisting in the agreement of two or more
persons to effect any unlawful purpose. 53 Conspiracy is thus

50. Id.
51. Adding to the confusion is the Tadic Appeals Chamber's unexplained
observation that conspiracy appears in the genocide section. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-A, at para. 189 (observing that Article 4 "sets forth various types of
offences in relation to genocide, including conspiracy, incitement, attempt and
complicity").
52. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, para. 170 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Mar. 15, 2002) (finding insufficient
proof of joint criminal liability for inhumane acts and cruel treatment while
the defendant was a warden of KP Dom because he lacked the requisite intent
and had not entered into an agreement with the guards), at
http://www.un.org/icty/krnojelac/trialc2/judgement/km-tj020315e.pdf.
53. For an example of this approach, see Prosecutorv. Musema, in which
the International Tribunal for Rwanda adopted the common law approach to
conspiracy in interpreting the meaning of its statute. Case No. ICTR-96-13-T,
paras. 187, 191 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Jan. 27, 2000),
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgementIindex.htm, affd on
other grounds, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Appeals
Chamber Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/
judgement/Arret/index.htm. Specifically, the tribunal concluded that "conspiracy to commit genocide is to be defined as an agreement between two or more
persons to commit the crime of genocide." Id. at para. 191. A comparable defi-
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distinguishable as a free-standing crime itself, rather than
simply a theory of liability such as joint enterprise, which
attaches to substantive offenses and depends upon those
offenses for analytical usefulness. 54 Under this view, the crime
of conspiracy is punishable even if the substantive offense that
is the object of the conspiracy never transpires and conspiracy
remains an inchoate crime. 5 In contrast, the civil law tradition
strictly defines conspiracy' by emphasizing that a "person cannot be punished for mere criminal intent or for preparatory acts
committed."5 6
Adopting a common law approach does not require embracing the additional position that an individual can be convicted
of both the substantive offense and the conspiracy to commit
that offense.57 This Article suggests that conspiracy is both useful and appropriate in mass rape prosecutions whether or not a
perpetrator has committed an underlying crime. Conspiracy
offers a suitable theory whether prosecutors use conspiracy as
an inchoate crime or whether they connect it with a crime that
actually occurred. Conspiracy to commit a crime and the substantive underlying crime itself are analytically separate and

nition of conspiracy in the war crimes context appears in UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 196 (1948), quoted
in Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 188, in which the United Nations
War Crimes Commission stated: "The doctrine of conspiracy is one under
which it is a criminal offence to conspire or to take part in an alliance ... to
achieve a lawful object by unlawful means." For a similarly expansive reading
of the concept of complicity by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, see 6 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 84, 85 n.4 (1948) (observing that it is not necessary for defendants accused of being "connected with" war crimes and crimes
against humanity to be part of a prearrangement with the person who actually
commits the crime to be found guilty).
54. See infra notes 104-36 and accompanying text for further discussion
of joint enterprise liability and conspiracy.
55. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, at para. 191 (reaching his conclusion by interpreting the conspiracy to commit genocide provisions in the statute for the Rwanda tribunal).
56. See id. at para. 187 (comparing the civil law approach to conspiracy
with the common law approach).
57. See, e.g., Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, at paras. 196-98 (adopting
a common law definition of conspiracy while holding that an accused cannot be
convicted of both genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide). The argument
that one can be convicted for both the substantive crime and conspiracy is a
position espoused in Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 592 (1961) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946)), but rejected in
Prosecutorv. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, at para. 198.
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distinct criminal offenses. As shown below, this quality provides an important distinction between
conspiracy and other
•••
58
theories of joint perpetrator liability.
The choice of the common law approach to conspiracy not
only derives from familiarity with the concept, 9 but also from
the conclusion that this approach is more consistent with the
relevant international law materials. Indeed, the Genocide
Convention's reference to conspiracy to commit genocidewhich provides the basis for the ICTY statute's authorization
for the same crime 60-appears grounded on the common law
approach to conspiracy.6 ' Myriad other international materials,
discussed below, support this conclusion.6 2 Conspiracy, con58. See infra notes 137-93 and accompanying text.
59. The Model Penal Code and the Federal Crimes Code are the major
texts that inform understanding of conspiracy in American criminal law. The
Model Penal Code defines criminal conspiracy as follows:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to
commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he: (a) agrees with such other person or persons that they
or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such
crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees
to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of
such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Courts describe
the elements of federal conspiracy as including "(1) an agreement among conspirators to commit an offense; (2) specific intent to achieve the objective of the
conspiracy; and (3) usually an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy."
United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1996). While recent precedent
does not reveal international negotiators making use of the Model Penal Code
in international materials, United States federal law appeared in negotiations
over the ICC statute. See Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International
Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L.F. 291, 294 n.13, 316, 317 n.86 (2001)
(observing that the United States delegation was guided by federal law and
U.S. military materials, rather than the Model Penal Code).
60. See David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling
Jurisprudencefrom the InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J.
231, 242 (2002) (reporting that "Article II of the Genocide Convention is reproduced verbatim in the... ICTY and ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda] Statutes").
61. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, at para. 187 (stating that background materials on the Genocide Convention establish that the "concept of
conspiracy relied upon the Anglo-Saxon doctrine of conspiracy"); see also Continuation of the Considerationof the Draft Convention on Genocide [El794]:
Report of the Economic and Social Council [A/633], U.N. GAOR 6th Comm.,
3d Sess, pt. 1, 83d mtg., at 212-13 (statement of Mr. Maktos) (defining conspiracy under "Anglo-Saxon law... [as] the agreement between two or more
persons to commit an unlawful act" and the importance of conspiracy theory as
a means "to prevent genocide as far as possible").
62. See infra notes 115-36 and accompanying text for discussion of con-
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ceived as a free-standing crime and defined as an agreement to
effect an unlawful purpose, is a distinct and important complement to the theories of both command responsibility and
joint criminal enterprise as articulated by the ICTY. Such
precedent would prove important for the ICC, which operates
pursuant to a statute arguably congenial to conspiracy prosecutions.
II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, JOINT ENTERPRISE,
AND CONSPIRACY
Command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise liability,
and conspiracy are closely connected. Indeed, as Professor
Mirjan Damagka has explained, "the primary responsibility of
commanders under international law is but a perfectly justified
application of municipal criminal law doctrines on complicity,
or various modalities of perpetration, to a special organizational setting."63 The ICTY has noted command responsibility's
overlap with joint criminal enterprise, finding that where a
commander participates in the commission of a crime through
the acts of his or her subordinates by "planning, instigating or
ordering" the crime, the commander's liability for command
responsibility "is subsumed under" the commander's liability
under the joint enterprise doctrine. 4
Despite this relationship, command responsibility has
proven a troublesome theory for ICTY prosecutors in the context of rape prosecutions. The difficulties encountered may
derive from practical and theoretical obstacles inherent in the
command responsibility doctrine, which may be partially
avoided through greater reliance on joint criminal enterprise
theory. Conspiracy provides an even more appropriate
approach than joint criminal enterprise theory.65 Well tailored
to the goals and mode of perpetuating rapes in wartime, conspiracy would prove particularly helpful in prosecuting leaders
or tactical masterminds, providing the world community another means of deterring rape as an incident of war.

spiracy's presence in other international materials.
63. Dama~ka, supra note 8, at 456.
64. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 605 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001), at http://www.un.orglicty/
krstic/trialC 1/judgement/krs-tjOlO8O2e.pdf.
65. See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text for further comparison
of conspiracy with joint criminal enterprise.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:30

A. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: PAST EXPERIENCE AND
PROBLEMS OF PROOF AND THEORY
1.

Experience in the ICTY

Defining command responsibility, the ICTY statute provides for liability of an individual when culpable acts were
"committed by a subordinate" and the individual "knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish
the perpetrators thereof."66 In the face of this relatively expansive definition, the ICTY has resisted attempts to expand command responsibility. For example, the Appeals Chamber
refused to interpret this provision as embracing liability for individuals holding equal authority to those who committed acts,
holding steadfastly to the requirement that the liable individ61
ual must hold a superior position. Opinions emerging from
ICTY rape prosecutions likewise reflect a restrained approach
to command responsibility, despite international law precedent
for command responsibility for wartime rapes.6 8
The Kunaracacquittal, which arose from the prosecution of
Bosnian Serb paramilitary officers for the 1992 rape and
enslavement of Bosnian Muslim women at the Foca prison
camp, provides an illustration. Trial evidence showed that
Kunarac operated as a commander during a period of time
when soldiers raped women prisoners, and that Kunarac himself admitted to leading a permanent group of approximately

66. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(3).
67. See Matthew Lippman, HumanitarianLaw: The Uncertain Contours
of Command Responsibility, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 78-79 (2001) (dis-

cussing the acquittal in Prosecutorv. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, paras. 197,
214 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998), at
http://www.un.org.icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/cel-tj981116e.pdf, affd, Case
No. IT-96-21-A, paras. 293, 314 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia
Appeals Chamber Feb. 20, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/
judgementcel-aj010220.pdf).
68. The Tokyo War Crime Trials convicted Japanese commanders of
command responsibility for the rapes committed by their soldiers during
World War II. See Christopher Scott Maravilla, Rape as a War Crime: The
Implications of InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's
Decisions in Prosecutor v. Kunaric, Kovac & Vukovic on International
Humanitarian Law, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 321, 337 (2001) (discussing the
introduction of rape as a war crime at the end of World War II). For a
discussion of the Japanese proceedings, see Lippman, supra note 67, at 11.
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fifteen soldiers.69 Evidence also revealed, however, that individual tasks would require Kunarac to use only four or five soldiers from this group at any one time and that the soldiers
returned to their respective brigades or detachments after
completing individual tasks. The Trial Chamber therefore concluded that more proof was required to establish that "the soldiers who committed the offences charged in the Indictment
were under the effective control of Kunarac at the time they
committed the offences."7 °
While showing willingness to expand command responsibility to accommodate loose hierarchical structure in contemporary military conflicts,7 1 the tribunal also revealed the doctrine's limitations in prosecutions of those in powerful positions
in the Celebici detention camp. Although convicting one of the
defendants-Zdravko Mucic-of command responsibility for
rapes and sexual assaults that took place under his watch,72 the
tribunal's application of command responsibility principles to
others resulted in acquittals. The tribunal acknowledged that
69. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, para. 626
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Feb. 22, 2001), at
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/knu-tjOlO22e.pdf,
affd, Case
Nos. IT-96-23/1-A, IT-96-23/1-A, para. 125 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber June 12, 2002), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/
appeal/judgement/kun-aj020612e.pdf.
70. Id. at para. 628 (emphasis omitted). The Trial Chamber opinion, however, is peppered with references that support knowledge and participation in
the rapes. See, e.g., id. at para. 651 (finding that Kunarac "was aware" of a
gang rape and that he worked "in concert" with another soldier in raping
women); id. at 652 (finding that Kunarac "was aware that [a woman] would be
subject to rapes and sexual assaults by soldiers at [a] house... when he took
her there"); id. at para. 656 (finding that Kunarac not only "committed the
crimes of torture and rape as a principal perpetrator," but that he also "aided
and abetted the other soldiers in their role as principal perpetrators").
71. The effects of this are reflected in the Milosevic case, where prosecutors are attempting to hold Milosevic responsible for atrocities not only in Kosovo, where his legal authority was clear, but also in Bosnia and Croatia, where
he was not in "direct de jure control." See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, ASIL
Insights: Trial of Milosevic (Oct. 2002) (explaining this distinction), available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh90.ktm; see also Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the InternationalCriminal
Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89, 139 (2000) (discussing alternative prosecution strategies against Milosevic depending upon the degree of de jure control that could be established).
72. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, at para. 1047 (rejecting Mucic's challenges
to command responsibility liability). Mucic was not convicted of rape itself. Id.
at para. 3.
73. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, at paras. 293, 314 (affirming the acquittal of Delalic and Delic on the command responsibility charges).
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responsibility could result even though an individual possessed
no formal commission or authority.74 Observing that a "tribunal
could find itself powerless to enforce humanitarian laws ... if it

only accepted as proof of command authority a formal letter of
authority,"75 the tribunal made clear that the ICTY statute recognized liability for power possessed "in either a de jure or a de
facto form." 76 The ICTY added, however, that no liability would
follow where "the link of control

...

[was] absent or too

remote."77 The tribunal explained that command culpability
would not follow from mere "substantial influence" not amounting to effective control (defined as the material ability to prevent or to punish subordinate wrongdoers).1
The tribunal applied these principles to Hazim Delic, a
Bosnian Muslim deputy commandant assigned to the Celebici
camp. Finding Delic guilty of rape as torture and therefore
guilty of a war crime in grave breach of the Geneva Conventions,79 the ICTY acquitted him of command responsibility for
crimes committed by lower ranked guards.8" Referring to witness statements that Delic "occasionally criticized" camp
guards severely and that they were afraid of him, the Trial
Chamber concluded this testimony did not establish a superior/subordinate relationship, but merely showed a "'degree of
influence' which could be 'attributable to the guards' fear of an
intimidating and morally delinquent individual." 81 The Appeals

Chamber upheld this restrained application of the command
responsibility doctrine, explaining that the doctrine is "anchored on the relationship between superior and subordinate,
and the responsibility of the commander for actions of members
of his troops." 2 A subordinate/superior relationship "is a sine
qua non for superior responsibility," the Appeals Chamber reasoned, because the command responsibility doctrine provides
74. Id. at para. 193.
75. Id.
76. Id. at para. 192.
77. Id. at para. 197.
78. Id. at paras. 257, 267 (rejecting the prosecution's push for a lower
threshold of control).
79. See Nahapetian, supra note 22, at 130 (1999) (reviewing the facts of
the Delic case).
80. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, at para. 305.
81. Id. at para 308 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21,
para. 806 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 16,
1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/cel-tj98116e.pdf).
82. Id. at para. 254 (quoting Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, at para. 647).
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for "a species of vicarious responsibility"8 3 that is designed to
regulate and ensure "military discipline." 4

2. Problems with Command Responsibility Liability
The Delalic and Kunarac acquittals are symptomatic of

practical and theoretical problems with command responsibility.85 Practical problems stem from difficulties of obtaining
competent proof. The essentially vicarious nature of liability
under the command responsibility theory largely accounts for

the theory's analytical shortcomings.
a. PracticalProblems with Getting Command Liability
Convictions
In recognizing de facto authority as a basis for command

responsibility, the ICTY responded to the realities of the Yugoslav conflict. Most notably, the tribunal pragmatically concluded that requiring a formal manifestation of authority could
undermine the ability of international criminal law to redress
the atrocities that attended the Yugoslav conflict. 6 As one
commentator has explained, liability for command responsibility requires a court to make the highly fact specific findings
that individuals hold the status of a superior or subordinate.87

The difficulties with this "status-based" standard are especially
pronounced "[i]n an era of... paramilitary organizations practicing terrorism and guerrilla warfare."8 8 The Yugoslav conflict

is well known for its guerilla quality, with combatants often
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Another example may be the case against General Tihomir Blaskic,
who was convicted and found responsible for the 1993 massacre at the village
of Ahmici in Croatian-controlled Western Bosnia. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, paras. 384-495 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia
Trial Chamber Mar. 3, 2000), at http://www.un.orgficty/blaskic/trialcl/
judgement/bla-tjOO0303e.pdf. Subsequent to his conviction, documents came to
light casting doubt on whether he was the actual commander. Specifically,
Blaskic's lawyers maintain that they can demonstrate that "the political leadership who had set up their own parallel command, and not General Blaskic,
ordered the Ahmici massacre." Marlise Simons, Archives Force Review of
Croat'sAtrocity Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A14.
86. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, at para. 193 (stating that a "tribunal
could find itself powerless to enforce humanitarian law[s] ... if it only
accepted as proof of command authority a formal letter of authority").
87. See Vetter, supra note 71, at 127 (arguing against the fact-specific
standard in the ICC).
88. Id.
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organized in loose structures lacking formal hierarchy. One
media observer described the warfare style as follows: "Except
for the city siege situations and a few large battles, the combat
has been mostly spontaneous, more resembling heavily armed
anarchy than organized warfare." 9 Proving command responsibility is so difficult that prosecutors have resorted to using war
reporters as witnesses, a practice that the tribunal has disapproved due to its problematic free speech implications. 90
Yugoslavian commanders have proven unusually elusive in
other respects as well. In contrast to the Nuremberg trialswhere prosecutors had access to vast documentary evidenceofficials in the former Yugoslavia apparently produced few such
documents.9 By necessity, therefore, ICTY prosecutors have
had to rely on circumstantial proof. Moreover, unlike Rwandan
leaders, who tended to be more open about their actions, leaders in the former Yugoslavia typically acted by stealth. 92 ICTY
prosecutors have pursued prosecutions of lower level fighters
"in order to have the necessary building blocks to indict people
right at the top."93 Command responsibility convictions are
likely one of the casualties of this covert style of warfare and
89. J.P. Mackley, The Balkan Quagmire Myth; Taking on the Serbs Would
Be More Grenada Than Vietnam, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1993, at C3. Mackley
continues:
Warfare in former Yugoslavia falls into four categories: 1) siege situations in which heavily armored Serbs employ artillery fire to cut off
and wear down defenders occupying fixed positions; 2) house-to-house
fighting where largely unorganized small groups spray automatic fire
at each other until the side that runs out of ammunition retreats;
3) largely unopposed movements against villages full of civilians;
4) small-unit commando raids.
Id.
90. See Nina Bernstein, Should War Reporters Testify Too?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2002, at B9 (reporting that "tribunal investigators have typically
sought from reporters ... legal links in a chain of evidence to prove that
accused officials had what prosecutors call 'command and control responsibility' for what happened on the killing fields"); see also Decision of Interlocutory
Appeal at para. 56, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Dec. 11, 2002) (quashing
the subpoena of war correspondent), at http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/appeal/
decision-2/randall021211.htm.
91. See Ivkovic, supra note 7, at 302 (explaining that "[ulnlike the circumstances after World War II, in the former Yugoslavia there are no victors and
losers, no easy access to evidence, and no detailed documentation").
92. See Judge Richard Goldstone, Living History Interview, 5 TRANSN'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 373, 380-81 (1995).
93. Id.; see also BASS, supra note 9, at 206-07, 223-76 (describing the
strategy of starting with low-level figures in conducting the ICTY prosecutions).
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control.
The practical problems of obtaining convictions for command responsibility are exacerbated in the context of rape.
Because wartime rapes often do not appear in public settings
and are frequently unsubstantiated by accurate eyewitness testimony,94 finding proof that a commander knew of the rapes or
acquiesced in their commission is especially difficult. Proof
problems are heightened where the command responsibility
theory is premised on failure to supervise, because actions that
occurred in private are less likely to fall within the superior's
reasonable control.
b.

TheoreticalProblems of Justifying Command Culpability

The ICTY's difficulties in catching and convicting "big
fish" 9 highlights a conceptual irony of prosecuting leaders for
war crimes they did not complete with their own muscle. On
the one hand, one can argue that these leaders are the most
culpable. The first lead ICTY prosecutor, Justice Goldstone,
embraced this perspective as a guiding principle of the tribunal: "With regard to the seriousness of the crimes, the most
guilty are those who ordered them."" Goldstone also argues
that ascribing blame to leaders can help to disassociate communities or groups of people from wrongdoing, a process vital
to effective healing.9 7 On the other hand, prosecuting leaders
94. See BASS, supra note 9, at 223 ("Some of [the cases against lower level
figures] rested on a small number of witnesses, if two or three could be intimidated out of testifying ... then the case would collapse.").
95. See, e.g., RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A
WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 107 (2000) (describing the media criticism about
ICTY's initial indictments of "small fish"); Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate Justice:Lessons from the Yugoslav
Tribunal,7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353, 356-57 (2001) (analyzing criticisms
of "relative paucity of indictments of high-level officials in the former Yugoslavia"). The reasons for the difficulties are complex and include concerns related
to political pressures, practical realities, and prosecutorial strategy.
GOLDSTONE, supra, at 107 (2000) (describing the obstacles to obtaining indictments, including political influence of the Dayton negotiations).
96. Richard J. Goldstone, The International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: A Case Study in Security Council Action, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 5, 7 (1995) (outlining the strategies and principles for ICTY prosecutors).
97. Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth
Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 485, 488 (1996) (explaining that prosecuting leaders can focus blame
away from ethnic, religious, or other groups). For example, Goldstone maintains that the "most important beneficiaries of the Nuremberg Trials were the
German people" because "focus was placed upon the accused as individual
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because they are leaders is inconsistent with the retributive
goal of international criminal law. The practical problems of
proving command responsibility may be symptomatic of a
deeper theoretical flaw in attempting to lay blame on individuals who are physically removed from war crimes.98
The process of establishing blame at a criminal trial helps
to satisfy the victim's and society's need for retribution. Yet,
command responsibility can cloud notions of individual guilt.
Command responsibility arguably includes vicarious liability
and thus suggests "a measure of insensitivity to the degree of
the actor's own personal culpability."' 99 This problem is most
extreme where command responsibility does not concern direct
orders, but simply a "failure to control" subordinates. 0 Under
these circumstances, command responsibility acts as a form of
"criminalized negligence," rather than a theory of direct wrongdoing.'0 1 Victims and society are therefore less able to experience the retribution that flows from identifying blameworthy
persons who actively committed a crime.
Recognizing that not every war criminal will come to justice, tribunal supporters point out that retribution is partially
served simply because victims have an opportunity to speak, to
expose the truth, and thereby to begin the process of healing.
Justice Goldstone argues that this healing takes place in part
because "exposure of the truth can help individualize guilt and
thus avoid the imposition of collective guilt on an ethnic, religious, or other group."0 2 A command responsibility prosecution
may not actually individualize guilt where the prosecution
criminals or leaders and not as Germans." Id. at 489.
98. Cf DamaAka, supra note 8, at 471 (illustrating the protections inherent in a hierarchy structure that protect superiors from prosecution).
Dama~ka explains that:
[Tihe more removed [superiors] are in ranks of authority from immediate perpetrators, the more the hierarchical hauteurenables them to
evade punishment by concealing either their complicity or acquiescence in crimes of their subordinates or by disingenuously pleading
ignorance of criminal activity. Paper trails leading to higher-ups can
be missing, or other circumstances arise that bedevil efforts to establish their links to the wrongdoing.
Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 456.
100. See Barbara Crossette, At the Hague, It's a Leader on Trial, Not a
People, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § WK, at 3 (quoting Professor Ruth Wedge-

wood, commenting on the war crimes trial of Slobodan Milosevic).
101. Id.
102. Goldstone, supra note 97, at 488 (outlining the ways in which peace
and justice are interwoven).
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lacks graphic proof of physical wrongdoing by the defendant
himself. Even where graphic proof of official misconduct is
available, the leader, prosecuted under a theory of official
responsibility and control over an intricate web of subordinates,
becomes a symbol for the people or for the community. 0 3 In this
respect, direct criminal liability may more effectively identify
individual wrongdoers. A command responsibility theory, by
contrast, can cast the group as the perpetrator of the crimes,
either because they operated as puppets under control of a
leader or as individual agents of evil that the commander was
negligent in failing to control. A tension (if not a contradiction)
emerges between the theory of command responsibility and the
retributive goal of individualizing guilt.
B. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

Understanding that symbolically potent war crimes prosecutions require more than trials for the direct perpetrators of
physical crimes, the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia developed an extensive body of joint criminal enter0
prise law.1'
Prosecutors have made extensive use of joint
criminal enterprise theories, applying the concept to establish
culpability where the proof necessary to establish command
responsibility was lacking.0 5 The ICTY's broad interpretation of
joint criminal enterprise liability is at times difficult to distinguish from the crime of conspiracy. 06 The limitations of joint
criminal enterprise liability emerge from a careful review of the
pertinent cases, in which the tribunal focused on the facts
underlying the ultimate crimes necessary to support joint
criminal enterprise liability, rather than the facts surrounding
planning of the crime. For example, prosecutions for joint
enterprise liability require proof "that the accused shared with
the person who personally perpetrated the crime the state of
103. An obvious test for this is the Milosevic trial. For a detailed description of events leading up to the trial, see CIGAR & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at
19-29.
104. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text for discussion of the
ICTY's expositions on joint criminal enterprise liability.
105. For example, the Appeals Chamber has said that intent in the joint
criminal enterprise liability can be shown "either directly or as a matter of
inference from the nature of the accused's authority within the camp or
organisational hierarchy." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 220
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
106. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
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0 7 Prosecutorial energy therefore
mind required for that crime.""
focuses on proof of an ultimate crime that the accused may not
have committed, and is diverted from exposing the planning of
the crime. This focus is appropriate to joint criminal enterprise
liability, which is a theory of complicity in crimes committed by
another. Experience suggests that ICTY prosecutors have
encountered obstacles and committed precious resources meeting this standard, and may have been more successful convicting culpable individuals if they were not required to focus on
the elements of the ultimate crime. 10 8
This burden appears particularly significant in the context
of rape, where trauma may prevent witnesses from testifying
with adequate detail to prove the ultimate acts of rape and
accurate eyewitness testimony is often lacking. 109 The Vukovie

107. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 613 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001) (quoting Decision on Form
of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend at
para. 31, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II June 26, 2001), at http://www.un.org/
icty/brdjanin/trialc/decision-e/10626F1215879.htm), at http://www.un.org/icty/
krstic/trialcl/judgement/krs-tjOlO8O2e.pdf.
108. Another example comes from the Furundzija prosecution, in which the
tribunal carefully considered the presence or nonpresence of the accused during the torture and rape of a woman. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, paras. 124-30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial
Chamber Dec. 10, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/
judgement/fur-tj981210e.pdf. The accused did not commit the rape, but interrogated the woman while the rape occurred. Id. Because the accused questioned the woman, the tribunal found that Furundzija aided and abetted the
rape by his presence. Id. The Trial Chamber reached this conclusion, however,
only after a reconstruction of the precise order of events. Id.
109. An example emerges from the acquittal of Zoran Vukovic, a member of
a military unit that repeatedly raped women from detention camps in the Foca
area. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, para. 10
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Feb. 22, 2001), at
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/udgement/kun-tj01022e.pdf. Vukovic was
acquitted of rapes that occurred in a classroom at a detention camp. Id. at
para. 878. The circumstances of the rape were traumatic and confusing. Five
women detainees were called out by name, taken to an empty classroom, and
each raped and abused by a different soldier. Id. at para. 786. A victim identified Vukovic as the man who raped her, and several other women corroborated
his presence. Id. at paras. 786-87. But the victim's testimony suggested that
she had identified the wrong man. Id. at paras. 788-89. The tribunal admitted
evidence focusing on the accuracy of the identification. When that evidence
failed, the Trial Chamber concluded that the prosecution did not meet its burden of showing that Vukovic had any role in the rape incident at all. Id. at
paras. 789-92. In other words, Vukovic may have been present raping another
woman or may have helped to plan and facilitate the rapes, but was acquitted
of any involvement because the victim could not identify which soldier raped
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acquittal may represent a typical breakdown in proof that could
arise in any context. The acquittal nonetheless suggests how
criminal law may fail to combat mass rape where the theory of
prosecution requires focus on the specifics of the ultimate act of
rape, rather than planning and strategy. The war crimes context magnifies these difficulties. Women subject to repeated
rapes may be unable to differentiate among different rapes and
different rapists. In the former Yugoslavia, these crimes often
occurred during extensive periods in captivity, under conditions
making it impossible for victims to keep track of time and
variations in circumstances. 10 Victims were subject to violence,
duress, and psychological oppression that are generally
unmatched in the domestic context,"' and were unable, legally,
politically, and practically, to make a "swift complaint" to municipal authorities who might take action to preserve evidence.'1 2
Unlike joint criminal enterprise liability, conspiracy establishes liability without necessary proof that others committed
some underlying offense. Thus, conspiracy avoids the special
problems in establishing the elements of an underlying offense
such as rape. This quality would enable conspiracy to contribute uniquely to the prosecution of those instrumental in making rapes committed as war crimes, grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, crimes against humanity, and genocide
possible. This Article now turn to this proposition.
C. CONSPIRACY: ITS ADVANTAGES AND SUITABILITY
IN THE WAR CRIMES CONTEXT

A key distinguishing characteristic of conspiracy is its
status as an independent crime imposing direct responsibility
on an accused. As such, conspiracy neither tracks the "complicity-based responsibility" of joint criminal enterprise responsibility 113 nor imposes the vicarious liability that command reher.
110. See Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View: Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 52 (1997).
111. See id. (contending that in formulating a special procedural rule of
rape-Rule 96-the ICTY judges "arguably differentiated the probative value
of victim testimony about sexual assaults committed during armed conflict
from the probative value of victim testimony concerning sexual assaults in a
non-armed conflict municipal trial court").
112. Id.
113. CIGAR & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 37 (describing the distinctions
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sponsibility may impose. 14 These qualities of conspiracy not
only make it an effective prosecutorial tool, but also an analytically appropriate theory suited to the goal of bringing to justice
those who use rape as an instrument of war, genocide, and
inhumane treatment.
1.

Conspiracy's Role in International Criminal Law

The ICTY statute mentions conspiracy in the genocide context, declaring that "conspiracy to commit genocide" is a punishable act.1" An identical provision appears in the statute of

the International Tribunal for Rwanda. 16 Thus, where prosecutors establish mass rapes that are committed with the intent to
destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, conspiracy
to commit rape may be an available theory of culpability. The
question remains, however, whether ICTY prosecutors may
pursue convictions for conspiracy to commit rape outside of the

genocide context. To evaluate conspiracy's availability to the
ICTY prosecutors outside of the genocide context, we look to
international customary law and the prohibition against ex post
facto laws, known in international law as the doctrine of nullem
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime without law, no

punishment without law).
Conspiracy's status in international customary law is
somewhat ambiguous. Materials as far back as the Nuremberg
Charter include conspiracy to commit crimes against peace as a
separate crime,117 and an identical provision appeared in the
between "direct responsibility," "command responsibility," and "complicitybased responsibility" under ICTY statute). The ICTY prosecutor appears to
have marshaled all three approaches in the case against Slobodan Milosevic.
See Indictment at paras. 5, 6, 27, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-I
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II Nov. 22, 2001), at
http://www.un.orglicty/indictment/Englishlmil-iiOll122e.htm.
114. See Dama~ka, supra note 8, at 456 (observing that command responsibility's embrace of vicarious liability suggests "a measure of insensitivity to
the degree of the actor's own personal culpability").
115. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, at art. 4(3)(b).
116. ICTY Statute for Rwanda art. 2(3)(b), 33 I.L.M. 1602-03, availableat
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs.statute.html, adopted by S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1600 [hereinafter Rwanda Statute].
117. The Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against peace to include the
"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, § 2, art. 6(a), 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288, 59
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charter for the Tokyo trials."" Yet, neither tribunal apparently
interpreted the charters as establishing conspiracy to commit
war crimes or crimes against humanity as separate crimes.' 19
One commentator on Nuremberg reported that "[e]ven though
the Charter provided that complicity in the commission of a
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity
is a crime under international law, the [tiribunal considered
this provision to be a theory of individual liability and not separate crimes." 2 ° Apparently, representatives of civil law countries, whose traditions did not embrace conspiracy as a theory
of criminal responsibility,
were troubled by including conspir12 1
acy in the Charter.
Despite conspiracy's status as a theory relatively foreign to
civil law countries, 122 the crime has frequently, albeit not conStat. 1544, 1547, reprinted in PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 142 (2000) and in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
141 (1998).
118. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Apr. 26, 1946, § 2,
art. 5(a)-(b), 4 Bevans 20, 28 (using the same language to define crimes
against peace to include "the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of
a...
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing" and also assigning criminal
responsibility to "[1]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit
any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan") (emphasis added). The Allied Powers also used
the same provisions to describe crimes against peace and similarly assigned
criminal responsibility for lower level military tribunals in Allied occupied
Germany. See Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50, 50-51 (1946).
119. WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT
NUREMBERG 555 (1954).
120. Major Edward J. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Principles, Command
Responsibility, and the Defense of Captain Rockwood, 149 MIL. L. REV. 275,
281 (1995).
121. Howard S. Levie, The ICTY Statute for the Former Yugoslavia: A
Comparison with the Past and a Look to the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L
L. & COM. 1, 11 n.60 (1995) (noting that the crime of conspiracy concerned
civil law countries/representatives); cf Michael P. Scharf, Trial of Milosovic,
ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 389, 392 (2002) (observing that a frequent complaint about Nuremberg was its use of the "concept of conspiracy which had
never before been recognized in continental Europe").
122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 186
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber Jan. 27, 2000) (describing the
limited view of conspiracy in civil law countries), at http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/index.htm,
affd on other grounds,
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sistently, appeared in international materials. The language
concerning conspiracy in the ICTY statute and the statute for
the International Tribunal for Rwanda owes direct lineage to
the Convention on Genocide, which obliges United Nations
members to make conspiracy to commit genocide a punishable
act in their domestic criminal codes. 23 Conspiracy also appears
in a myriad of other international conventions covering criminal law matters. For example, the crime is proscribed in vari124
ous conventions dealing with the international drug trade 2 6
125 as well as slavery and apartheid.1
and money laundering,

Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Appeals Chamber Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHI/cases/
Musemaljudgement/arret/index.htm.
123. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. III(b), S.EXEC. DOc. 0, at 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S.
277, 280 (including "conspiracy to commit genocide" in a list of punishable
acts). The Genocide Convention imposes criminal responsibility for conspiracy,
attempt, complicity, and incitement to commit the crime of genocide. Pertinent
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, however, "limit the imposition of criminal
responsibility to those who committed or ordered the commission of a grave
breach." Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in
the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 800 n.58 (1995). But cf.
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, at para. 187 (noting that the Genocide Convention adopted the broad Anglo-Saxon definition of conspiracy).
124. See Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous
Drugs, June 26, 1936, art 2(c), 198 L.N.T.S. 299, 309, amended by Protocol
Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs Concluded at the Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and
19 February 1925, and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at
Geneva on 26 June 1936, Dec. 11, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 12 U.N.T.S. 179
(requiring signatory states to make legislation providing for the severe punishment of conspiracy to traffick drugs). Later drug trade conventions also referenced conspiracy. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted Dec. 19, 1988,
art. 3(1)(c)(iv), 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) (including "conspiracy to commit [drug
trafficking]" as an offence); Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 25, 1972, art. 14, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 48, 18 (mending
art. 36(2)(a)(ii) to include "conspiracy to commit" narcotics offences as a crime).
125. Signatories to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime are encouraged
to incorporate the crime of conspiracy in their domestic money laundering
statutes. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, art. 6(1)(d), E.T.S. No.
141, 3 (requiring "each party to adopt legislation ... establishing conspiracy to
commit laundering offences as an offence under domestic law") (emphasis
added).
126. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of "Apartheid", U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2185th plen. Mtg., Annex,
Supp. No. 30 at 76, art. 111(a), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (providing for international criminal responsibility for those who "[clommit, participate in, directly
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Discussion of conspiracy in the context of head of state immunity and the International Criminal Court reinforce the crime's
12 7
presence within the fabric of international criminal law.
Courts have also discussed conspiracy as it relates to the
United States Alien Tort Claims Act. 12 Interpreting that Act,
"courts have concluded that certain forms of indirect participation in state-committed wrongs may render an individual
liable," with individual liability arising from "conspiracy or conspiracy-like participation with state actors committing violations of the laws of nations."'29
Conspiracy's validity in these myriad contexts suggests
that the ex post facto prohibition does not stand as an obstacle
for ICTY prosecutors and others who wish to use the offense in
executing provisions under international criminal law. 130 In
making this argument, we note that, beginning in 1992, the
Security Council informed those involved in the Yugoslavian
incite or conspire in the commission of the acts [of apartheid]"); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, The Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, art. 6(1), T.I.A.S. 6418, 3206,
266 U.N.T.S. 3, 43 (making "being a party to conspiracy" to engage in slavery
a punishable act); see also Study on Ways and Means of Insuring the Implementation of International Instruments Such as the International Convention
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Including the
Establishment of the International Jurisdiction Envisaged by the Convention,
HUM. RTS. COMM., 37th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 17, at 35, 76, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1426 (1981), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 117, at 697, 725
("A person commits conspiracy when, with intent to commit a specific offence,
he agrees with another to the commission of that offence and one of the members of the conspiracy commits an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.").
127. See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International
Criminal Court, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 720 (1996) (noting that the Inter-

national Criminal Court could play an important role in eliminating uncertainties about definitional concepts "such as complicity and conspiracy and the
attempt to commit such crimes, whose content varies from one country to the
next"); Jamison G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction,the ICC, and a Wake-up Call for FormerHeads of
State, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 154 (1999) (arguing that creating "loophole [s] for heads of state merely because they do not themselves have blood on
their hands runs contrary to the established laws of conspiracy and accomplicity"); see also infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text for a review of ICC
statutory drafts and other materials discussing conspiracy.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
129. Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, Intetnational Law and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 497 (2001).

130. See Jordan J. Paust, Addendum: Prosecution of Mr. Bin Laden et al.
for Violations of International Law and Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims,
ASIL INSIGHTS (Sept. 21, 2001) (pointing out instances in which ex post facto
problems have been avoided because international crimes were already recognized under customary international law), at http://www.asil.org/insights.htm.
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atrocities that "they were bound by existing international
humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions and
Genocide Convention."' These warnings, as well as conspiracy's well-established roots in international conventional and
customary law, put on notice those who may be prosecuted for
conspiracy. By avoiding vicarious liability, conspiracy arguably
presents a milder theory of responsibility than two others that
the ICTY has expressly embraced: command responsibility and
joint criminal enterprise. From this perspective the ICTY
prosecutors should encounter no ex post facto obstacle to conspiracy prosecutions, given authority that nullem crimen sine
lege, nulla poena sine lege presents no obstacle to milder criminal laws imposed after a criminal transaction or occurrence.13 2
The conclusion that the doctrine of nullem crimen sine lege,
nulla poena sine lege is not an obstacle does not eliminate questions that often emerge in conspiracy prosecutions, such as the
availability of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay

131. See Scharf, supra note 121, at 393.
132. See United States v. List, 11 Trials of War Crime 1230, 1239 (U.S.
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1948) (opining that "[iut
is not essential that a
crime be specifically defined"); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 8 (2000) (discussing the principle of nullem crimen sine lege,
nulla poena sine lege and noting that "principles of legality in international
criminal law differ from those of many legal systems in that they are less rigorous than, for example, positivist legal systems"); cf. DamaAka, supra note 8,
at 483 (arguing that imputed responsibility for war crimes as a greater stigma
than the offence of faulty supervision and that nullem crimen sine lege, nulla
poena sine lege "does not bar the use of milder criminal laws enacted after the
event").
Conspiracy's context-sensitive quality should not provide an obstacle under ICTY precedent. Indeed, the tribunal's Appeals Chamber has recognized
that such contexual understanding of criminal law is appropriate in adjudicating crimes against humanity. In Prosecutor v. Kuranac, the Trial Chamber
explained that crimes against humanity must be widespread and systematic,
but that requirement may be demonstrated by a link between a single criminal act and a systematic campaign against a civilian population. Case Nos IT96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, para. 417 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavla Trial
Chamber Feb. 22, 2001) (quoting Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Case at p. 510, Prosecutor v. Mrksic,
Case No. IT-95-13-R61 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals
Chamber
Apr.
3,
1996),
at
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm),
at
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kun-tj010222e.pdf). Within the
context of the Nazi's systematic persecution of Jews during World War II, the
act of turning in a Jew to Nazi authorities takes on special significance and is
linked to the campaign against an entire population. Id. at para. 431 (quoting
Prosecutor v. Kupregic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, para. 550 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Former
Yugoslavia
Trial
Chamber
Jan.
14,
2000),
at
http://www.un.orgicty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/kup-tjOO 0114e.pdf).
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rule, venue and joinder rules, and the necessity of an overt act
requirement. Many materials cover these issues, although the
'
Model Penal Code is a particularly helpful starting place. 33
The same holds true for those who will prosecute at the
ICC. While the state of the law under the ICC is still uncertain
and subject to some debate, 3 1 the statute's relatively broad
command responsibility 135 renders conspiracy milder and thus
less problematic. Finally, because the world community condemns rape as ajus cogens crime, 136 the joinder of the rape and
conspiracy crimes are unlikely to encounter doctrinal obstacles
in either the ICC or the ICTY.
2. Conspiracy Is Likely an Effective Theory for War Criminals
Conspiracy prosecution has at least two faces. First, prosecutors sometimes charge conspiracy as an inchoate crime. In
this context, the law's purpose is generally to prevent further
crime from occurring and to prosecute criminal conduct at the
early stages of growth before harmful activity unfolds on a
large scale. 37 Equally relevant are conspiracy prosecutions that
occur after an attempted or completed "substantive
offense" occurs. 138 In these contexts, society punishes conspiracies on the theory that "joint action is, generally, more dangerous than individual action." 39 The United States Court of
133. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 389-90 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
134. See infra, notes 187-207 for an outline of relevant ICC provisions and
analysis of their scope.
135. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
art. 28(b)(i), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome
Statute] (including such things as liability for civilian leaders who "either
knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that
subordinates were committing or about to commit ...crimes"), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
136. See, e.g., Angela M. Higgins, Comment, Else We Are Condemned to Go
from Darkness to Darkness: Victims of Gender-Based Crimes and the Need for
Civil Redress in U.S. Courts, 70 U. MO. KAN. CITY. L. REV. 677, 691 (2002)

(observing that condemnation of sexual slavery is ajus cogens norm).
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 387-88 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (describing the reasons for authorizing conspiracy prosecutions for
inchoate crimes as a basis for "preventive intervention by the agencies of law
enforcement and for the corrective treatment of persons who reveal that they
are disposed to criminality").
138. Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time To Turn Back from an
Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3
(1992).
139. United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991); see
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted that joint action of a
group is more threatening than individual actions because collaboration makes possible division of labor and psychological
support.14 According to this view, conspiracies pose an additional risk that the object of the conspiracy will be achieved and
therefore warrant a penalty as a separate crime.' Indeed, as
the United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated, the
agreement to commit a crime is "a distinct evil," which may
exist and
142 be punished whether or not the substantive crime
ensues.
The law deems conspiracy to pose a public threat
"over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant
substantive crime."'43 This conclusion has two premises: The
law assumes that the combination of individuals to commit
crime not only makes commission of other crimes more likely,
but also reduces44the chance that individuals will abandon their
criminal plans.

Though conspiracy is an available theory for all defendants, these rationales are particularly well suited for prosecuting criminal masterminds and heads of conspiracies. It is these
key players who often initiate the agreements to commit crime

also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 387 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (explaining that the crime of conspiracy is "a means of striking against the special danger incident to group activity, facilitating prosecution of the group, and
yielding a basis for imposing added penalties when combination is involved").
140. Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1394. According to the Model Penal Code:
In the course of preparation to commit a crime, the act of combining
with another is significant both psychologically and practically, the
former because it crosses a clear threshold in arousing expectations,
the latter because it increases ... the fortitude to purpose. The actor
knows, moreover, that the future is no longer governed by his will
alone; others may complete what he has had a hand in starting, even
if he has had a change in heart.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 388 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
141. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. In making this argument,
we do not suggest that it is necessary to provide for liability for conspiracy
where the perpetrator is found guilty of the ultimate crime itself. See supra
note 57 and accompanying text for discussion of controversy surrounding this
concept. We note, however, that liability for both conspiracy and an underlying
crime is particularly appropriate where the perpetrator acted as a leader of
the conspiracy.
142. United States v. Recio, 123 S. Ct. 819, 820 (2003) (quoting Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961)); see
also United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (arguing that the
public may be more injured by conspiracy than from the commission of the
underlying crime itself).
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and whose charisma, intelligence, and power fuel the conspiratorial process. Ironically, these actors are also most often capable of eluding conviction, either because their status and power
provide them with a network for maintaining underworld or
fugitive status, or because they have skillfully distanced themselves from actual acts of substantive crime. 14 5 They may be
able to avoid individual responsibility under aiding and abetting or joint enterprise theories because of a prosecutor's inability to connect their conduct or state of mind with a particular
ultimate crime.
Prosecuting conspiracy may help bring to justice leaders
who organize and inspire criminal activity. By focusing on
agreement among parties and by taking on the status of an
individual crime, conspiracy allows the prosecution to avoid the
unnecessary and sometimes fatal focus on a crime committed
by another perpetrator. Conspiracy makes possible punishment
for integral organizational actors who plan, deliberate, and
reflect on criminal schemes but do not necessarily perpetuate
the planned action.1 46 Any concerns that this approach gives
prosecutors undue license to pursue vicarious liability 147 can be
checked by requiring a clear showing of membership in the conspiratorial group as well as intent to enter into an agreement
with a criminal purpose.
Two ICTY cases illustrate how conspiracy would have
proven an appropriate and effective theory in prosecuting leading figures: Dragoljub Kunarac and Hazim Delic. 1 4 In the
145. Dama~ka, supra note 8, at 471.
146. Arguably, conspiracy helps to bolster the view of a mastermind in
such circumstances as a "perpetrator behind the perpetrators." Id. at 460 n.7
(reviewing some of the literature on this controversial construct).
147. See, e.g., id. at 456 (questioning whether it is appropriate for international criminal justice to disregard the culpability restricting principles of
municipal law of vicarious liability).
148. Despite the prosecutorial advantages of a conspiracy theory, one
common advantage for conspiracy prosecutions-the co-conspirator exception
to the hearsay rule-would probably not provide special service to ICTY prosecutors. Indeed, ICTY evidentiary rules appear flexible enough that a
co-conspirator exception would not add significantly to the admission of hearsay and other evidence that might be excluded under stricter evidentiary
regimes. The court has given chamber judges broad discretion for the admissibility and probative value of hearsay evidence. See Judgment on Allegations of
Contempt Against Prior Counsel Milan Vujin at para. 93, Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals
Chamber Jan. 31, 2000) (rejecting the common law approach that excludes
hearsay evidence and emphasizing the broad discretion ICTY judges may
employ in evaluating such evidence), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/
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Kunarac case, the record is replete with Trial Chamber findings suggesting that Kunarac acted in concert with other soldiers, assisted them, and was aware that the soldiers were
committing rape, even though he was acquitted of command responsibility for the rapes.149 The Trial Chamber findings that
Kunarac himself committed rape with more abstract goals than
mere sexual gratification were particularly telling of possible
conspiratorial intent. 150 Kunarac also left women "with his men
in the knowledge that they would rape them" '' and acted as a
"co-perpetrator" with other soldiers.' The Trial Chamber further found that he "played a leading organisational role and
that he had substantial influence over some of the other perpevujin-e/uuj-aj010227e.pdf; see also Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence at para. 15, Prosecutor v. Aleksovkski, Case No. IT-9514/1-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Feb. 16,
1999) (noting that it is well settled that hearsay evidence is admissible), at
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e. This latitude and flexibility is based on Rule
89(C) of the ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, which allows trial chambers to admit "any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value."
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, R.
89(C), reprinted in JOHN E. ACKERMAN & EUGENE O'SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 421 (2000); see also Dama~ka, supra note 8, at 481-82 (noting
that evidentiary barriers are not as high in international tribunals as those in
the Anglo-American legal tradition, as demonstrated by liberal use of hearsay).
149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T,
para. 651 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Feb. 22,
2001) (finding that Kunarac "was aware" of a gang rape and that he worked
"in concert" with another soldier in raping women), at http://www.un.org/
icty/focatrialc2/judgement/kun-tj010222e.pdf, affd, Case Nos. IT-96.23,
IT-96-23/1-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber June
12, 2002), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/appeal/judgement/kun-tj020612e.pdf;
id. at para. 652 (finding that Kunarac "was aware that [a woman] would be
subject to rapes and sexual assaults by soldiers at [a] house ... when he took
her there"); id. at para. 656 (finding that Kunarac not only "committed the
crimes of torture and rape as a principal perpetrator," but that he also "aided
and abetted the other soldiers in their role as principal perpetrators").
150. See id. at para. 654. (finding that Kunarac "acted intentionally and
with the aim of discriminating between the members of his own ethnic group
and the Muslims"). The Trial Chamber also found that Kunarac told women
"that they would give birth to Serb babies; or that they should 'enjoy being
fucked by a Serb.'" Id. The findings also support a conspiracy theory in that
Kunarac not only "committed the crimes of torture and rape as a principal perpetrator," but that he also "aided and abetted the other soldiers in their role as
principal perpetrators." See id. at para. 656.
151. Id. at para. 670 (using this finding to establish that Kunarac aided
and abetted in the rape and torture his men committed).
152. Id. at para. 714 (finding that "Kunarac and the two other soldiers
acted as principal co-perpetrators").
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trators." 3 Although Kunarac was convicted of some rapes himself, and was convicted of aiding and abetting other rapes,
these findings could have provided the basis for a conspiracy
conviction, which would have reflected more directly Kunarac's
culpability for his leadership role. 54 A conspiracy prosecution
would have better met the retributive and preventative purposes of the war crimes tribunal and recognized more fully the
particular damage that Kunarac caused in leading a campaign
of rapes.
In the Delic case, the ICTY convicted Hazim Delic of individual responsibility for a number of crimes committed at the
Celebici prison camp, but acquitted him of command responsibility."5 Despite this acquittal, the Trial Chamber determined
that he "was instrumental in creating an atmosphere of terror,"
"abused his position of authority and trust as deputy commander," and "encouraged others among the camp guards to
engage in their own forms of mistreatment of the detainees." 6
The Trial Chamber record contains many findings suggesting
that, had the prosecutors tried the case with a conspiracy theory, they would have successfully proven criminal culpability
for conduct that otherwise eluded punishment under the failed
command responsibility theory. Representative findings supporting a conspiracy theory include determinations that Delic
was ordered to assist the camp commander by "organising and
arranging for the daily activities in the camp,"" 7 and that he
was "involved in the operation of the camp on a daily basis.""'
The findings also suggest that Delic was known for intimidating guards into criminal acts,' 59 and that the crimes committed
against prisoners at the camp were so common that there was
153. Id. at para. 863 (finding that Kunarac's leadership role amounted to
an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of sentencing).
154. See id.
155. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, paras. 800-09 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998), at
affd
http://www.un.org.icty/celebici/trialc2/j udgementcel-tj981116e- 1.htm,
Case No. IT-96-21-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Feb. 20, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/celaj010220/pdf.
156. Statement of the Trial Chamber at the Judgment Hearing at 10,
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/celsumj981116e.htm.
157. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, at para. 310.
158. Id. at para. 313.
159. See id. at para. 305.
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"no way that Delic could not have know about them."16 °
While these examples suggest that conspiracy would be
effective in bringing justice to the masterminds and leaders,
the theory might also provide a useful, and perhaps necessary,
alternative for prosecuting those on the periphery of a conspiracy. Such "smaller fish" include those whose support is
detached from any underlying offense but is nonetheless essential to the conspiracy's object. For example, a local civilian official who agrees with a military leader to keep civilian law
enforcement away from a house that the military plans to use
for large-scale rape of local women could be prosecuted under a
conspiracy theory. The civilian official may not be involved in
planning or perpetrating the rapes themselves and may for
that reason not be subject to successful aiding and abetting or
joint criminal enterprise liability. Nonetheless, the law
enforcement official's agreement contributes significantly to the
rape house's effect of terrorizing the local population. While the
official may not be as influential to the criminal enterprise as a
leader, his actions merit punishment and his prosecution may
make possible successful
convictions of those higher up the lad61
der of culpability. 1
3. Conspiracy Is Analytically Suited for Prosecuting
Systematic or Wartime Rape
Not only can conspiracy afford prosecutors a potent
weapon, but the crime is well suited to the purposes and context of international rape prosecutions. As examined below, the
particular contexts in which rapes were perpetrated within the
160. Id. at para. 313. While it is true that the Appeals Chamber did not
accept the prosecutor's argument that Delic had command responsibility, the
argument might have been more compelling in the conspiracy context. See id.
161. Another fact pattern that could illustrate how conspiracy could be
helpful for prosecuting peripheral-yet essential-figures who contribute to
perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity comes from the World
War II figure Hermann Roechling. Roechling was a steel industry executive
who owned or operated factories that used prison labor. Many of these factories existed symbiotically with military prison camps where workers were mistreated. See generally Vetter, supra note 71, at 128. One could imagine facts
under which a factory owner such as Roechling is not sufficiently tied to various ultimate crimes committed at the prison camps to subject him to aiding
and abetting or joint enterprise liability. Likewise, camp guards may not have
been under the control of Roechling for the purpose of command responsibility.
Yet, the factory owner such as Roechling was clearly operating pursuant to an
agreement with the prison camp official, the object of which was to systematically mistreat and exploit the inmates. See id.

2003]

YUGOSLAV RAPE TRIALS

former Yugoslavia were not isolated instances of rape,'62 but
rather were strategically implemented, and sometimes systematic and large-scale campaigns directed at whole communities.
Using a conspiracy theory to prosecute these crimes ensures
that the law vindicates the goals of preventing and punishing
such community violence. Yoking the crime of conspiracy with
the crime of rape emphasizes this special context for international criminal law's intervention. Criminalizing conspiracy to
rape thus operates symbolically, emphasizing the gravity of
63
rape
as ajus cogens
crime1
and specifically
condemning its use
in a collective,
wartime,
or systematic
context.
a. Conspiracyand the Goals of InternationalCriminalLaw
Conspiracy's unique contribution to combating wartime or
systematic rapes derives from its purpose of reaching collective
activity. The crime acknowledges the special danger of group
criminality and reaches those who use rape as an instrument of
terror, war, and genocide, whether or not they actually perpetrated or planned a sexual act. Such broad criminal goals likely
emerge within a group context and can take hold as governing
justifications for large-scale activity with or without the assistance of a formal hierarchy needed to make out command
162. We note that controversy exists concerning the role of international
criminal law in punishing what can be characterized as isolated instances of
rape. See, e.g., Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: FemaleFriendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court,
16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 317, 347 (2002) (arguing that the failure to include rape
as an independent crime inappropriately fails to vindicate violence done to
individual women raped as part of isolated incidents). Making such distinctions is indeed fraught with potential difficulty. We hasten to note the substantial overlap between "domestic" rapes and more systematic rape campaigns. For example, Fionnuala Ni Aolain points out evidence establishing
that "during the Yugoslav conflict, women were assaulted and raped by men
they knew, by neighbors and acquaintances." Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical
Rules: The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of
Sexual Violence in War, 60 ALB. L. REV. 883, 902 (1997). It was the domestic
quality of these rapes that gave them special potency: "There was perceptible
danger that the proximity of pre-war relationships would give defendants the
intimate knowledge and capacity to exploit their victims' prior relationships as
a means to justify their own behavior." Id.
163. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 187
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Jan. 27, 2000) (explaining that
in civil law traditions conspiracy is confined to truly egregious acts), at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/Musema/judgement/index.htm,
affd on
other grounds, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Appeals
Chamber Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/
judgement/arret/index.htm.
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responsibility. Thus, not only do conspiracy prosecutions make
possible greater numbers of convictions, but these prosecutions
also specifically recognize the special dangers of group criminality that international criminal law is designed to deter.
The fact that conspiracy assigns direct responsibility
(which is not always accomplished under command responsibility).. reinforces this deterrent purpose. Too many wrongs go
unpunished, however, for criminals to believe that prosecution
is certain in all cases. As a result, fear of punishment cannot
account for all of a war tribunal's deterrent effect. International
criminal law's deterrent function thus hinges on the credibility
and power of those limited convictions that are achieved. The
more direct the liability and proof of individual wrongdoing, the
more important the conviction is in shaping the conduct of others. Under such circumstances, war crime trials help prevent a
society from engaging in denial and perpetrators from crying
"victor's justice" and characterizing themselves as scapegoats.165
As a crime of individual wrongdoing, conspiracy avoids this
criticism and reinforces the goal of deterrence.
At the same time, the crime of conspiracy stands as an
important counterpoint to the occasional reluctance to treat
rape seriously in both the international as well as the domestic
setting. Scholars have noted that sexual violence may not be
taken seriously because "sex is something people also engage in
voluntarily-unlike, for example, beatings and similar violent
crimes." 6 6 Many legal systems refer to rape as a "crime of
honor, which sounds less serious than a crime of violence." 67
164. See, e.g., Damalka, supra note 8, at 456-65 (reviewing the reasons
why command responsibility may be problematic in the war crimes context);
Jimmy Gurul6, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?,35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 43
(2002) (arguing that the liberal construction of command responsibility by
ICTR and ICTY "blurs any meaningful distinction between a legal duty and
moral obligation").
165. See Michael Ignatieff, Article of Faith, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP,
Sept./Oct. 1996, at 117-18 (arguing that legal proceedings such as the war
crimes trials can use evidentiary rules to "confer legitimacy on otherwise contestable facts" and "[can] make it more difficult for societies to take refuge in
denial") cited in Goldstone, supra note 97, at 503.
166.

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCIA MCCORMICK, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN

INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 35 (Occational Paper
No. 1, Int'l Human Rights Law Inst., DePaul Univ. 1996) (discussing challenges the International Criminal Tribunal faces in proving sexual violence as
a method of ethnic cleansing).
167. Id.
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Combining the crimes of conspiracy and rape helps to counteract this tendency to trivialize sexual violence.
b. Conspiracyand the Context of Wartime
and Systematic Rapes
The world population will likely benefit greatly from the
considerable efforts by scholars and prosecutors to study and to
document systematic rape perpetrated in the Yugoslav conflict.
This effort exposes not only what women in the former Yugoslavia experienced, but populations in other conflicts as well.
With this learning and understanding we will best be able to
tailor international criminal prosecutions in the future and
may ultimately come closer to preventing the crimes altogether.
For present purposes, the studies reveal diverse schemes for
rapes perpetrated in the Yugoslav conflict. This Article's review
of these schemes uncovers many appropriate circumstances for
conspiracy prosecutions, circumstances that unfortunately may
repeat themselves in other conflicts.
Simon Chesterman summed up rape campaigns in the
former Yugoslavia as follows:
[Rape] is at once an instrument of the military objective to drive

populations from their homes and the subject of widespread political
propaganda. It is used as an instrument of fear as well as a means of
impregnating women (seen to be bearing children of the conqueror's

ethnicity). In this way, rape functions as both an intimate violation of
a woman and a grotesque public display of domination: The rape of a
woman's body symbolically represents the rape of the community itself."

The United Nations Commission of Experts-whose work
formed the basis for the ICTY-provides detail that expands
and catalogues the various strands of this analysis. The Commission identified a number of ways in which rape was used as
part of a greater plan that, by necessity, was the subject of a
conspiracy. In fact, the Commission identified five separate
patterns of rape; some or all of these patterns emerged from
plans to accomplish a predetermined objective. As described by
the Commission, the schemes included (1) sexual assault
related to the looting and intimidation of the target ethnic
group; (2) sexual assault related to the local fighting; (3) sexual
assault in detention facilities; (4) sexual assault used as part of

168. Simon Chesterman, Never Again... and Again: Law, Order,and the
Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 327-28
(1997).
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"ethnic cleansing"; and (5) detention of women for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers.'69
Each of these patterns presents a role for conspiracy theory, with each suggesting varying degrees of agreement to rape.
In the first pattern, the commission reported that the rapes
occurred within a gang atmosphere in which all attackers participated in the event, even though all did not sexually assault
the victims.7 In some instances, women were taken from their
homes to specific locations, 7 ' indicating preplanning and
agreement among a broad group of individuals as to where to
move the women. In the second group of rapes, the assaults
occurred either as attacking forces secured an area or thereafter in connection with a roundup or public assault followed by
transportation to camps. 7 2 This also suggests prior agreement
among perpetrators and possibly others.
The third and fourth patterns of sexual assault, occurring
in detention camps, provide the most compelling suggestions of
conspiracy. In the third pattern, soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries, and others picked out women from camps and usually took them away to rape and sexually assault them. 73 In
some instances, women were raped and sexually assaulted
within the camps in front of other detainees . Sexual assault
of men usually occurred at the camps in public. "' In the fourth
pattern, women reported that they were detained for the sole
purpose of rape and sexual assault. 176 They based this conclusion on their observations that all women detained were
attacked in this way, the attacks were frequent, and the captors often stated that they were trying to impregnate the
women. 7 7 Captors frequently treated pregnant women better

than their nonpregnant counterparts, and pregnant women
remained in custody beyond the point when they could abort
169. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution § I(C) (1992), Annex IX: Rape and
Sexual Assault, adden. 2 (Vol. 5), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994), available at
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/IX.htm [hereinafter FinalReport].
170. Id.
171. Id. (reporting that the size of the groups of men ranged from four to
fifteen).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.

YUGOSLAV RAPE TRIALS

2003]

the pregnancy."' Some detainees reported that women were
raped once per night on an apparent schedule. 179 For both of the
third and fourth patterns, evidence of conspiracy among perpetrators and others emerges from the similarities among the incidents, the high rate of occurrence, and the necessity for consent or complicity by those who ran the camps.
The fifth pattern shows similar signs of deliberate planning. Women were taken to predesignated sites where they
provided sexual gratification for the armed forces.8 Unlike in
the detention camps, perpetrators did not try to provoke reactions among other detained women, and the victims were ultimately killed more often than exchanged. 8
In addition to the necessity for preplanning reflected in
these patterns, the presence of motive as well as apparent
organization and hierarchy among perpetrators reveal that culpable conspiracies existed. As explained by two scholars who
investigated these crimes, M. Cherif Bassiouni and Marcia
McCormick, sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia was
"deliberately and systematically employed as a tool of 'ethnic
cleansing' and in service of the "strategic objective of forcibly
removing civilian populations from certain areas" so as to
"achieve the political goal of 'Greater Serbia."" 82 These conclusions are derived in part from the context, circumstances, and
patterns of the rapes. The reported cases occurred "in conjunction with an effort to displace the civilian population of a targeted ethnic group from a given region." 8 ' Sexual violence
proved a particularly effective instrument in the campaign of
ethnic cleansing in Bosnian Muslim communities.'8 4 According
to the culture of these communities, women become tainted by
sexual relations outside marriage, even when the relations
were forced.8 5 "Unmarried women become unmarriageable;
married women become outcasts in their own families." 86 The
Ljubljana newspaper apparently carried a report of a plan followed by the Yugoslav National Army, Psychological Opera-

178.

Id.

179.

Id. § II(A)(38)(a).

180.

Id. § I(C).

181.

Id. at 7.

182.

BASSioUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 166, at 15.

183.

Final Report, supra note 169, § I(C).

184.

BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 166, at 6.

185.

Id.

186.

Id.
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tions Department, that concluded that Muslim "morale, desire
for battle, and will could be crushed .

.

. easily by raping

women, especially minors and even children, and by killing
members of the Muslim nationality inside their religious facilities .

According to a report issued by a United Nations Security
Council Commission of Experts, factors showing organization
include victim recollections of perpetrators declaring that they
were ordered to assault victims sexually.18 Other factors identified in the report suggesting that the rapes occurred as part of
a structured campaign included "similarities among practices
in noncontiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission
of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military
activity; . . . [and] maximizing shame and humiliation to not

only the victim but also the victim's community." 9 In citing
these patterns, the Security Council Commission reasoned that
"some level of organization and group activity" was required to
perpetrate the rapes and sexual assaults reported. 9 The widespread incidence of rape and sexual assault is the first indication of a policy: The Security Council Commission was able to
document at least 1100 cases. T9 Other evidence suggesting a
plan consented to or developed by military and political leadership includes the large number of rapes occurring within controlled environments, such as detention camps, and the decrease in incidents after world media attention reached its
peak.192 This reduction in the face of media attention also suggests that the violations were part of a controllable plan known
by the leader. The Security Council Commission that took evidence on sexual violence concluded that, although Bosnian
Muslims and Croats allegedly perpetrated widespread rapes
and other crimes against Serbian women, evidence of policy
planning was confined largely to Serbian perpetrators. 3

187. Id. at 21 n.4 (quoting Kresimir Meier & Mirjana Glusac, Rape as a
Means of Battle, DELO, Feb. 23, 1993, at 6, reprinted in F.B.I.S. Daily Report,
Eastern Europe, Mar. 23, 1993, at 25).
188. FinalReport, supra note 169, § I(C).
189. Id.

190. Id. § I(D).
191.
192.

Id. § I(A).
BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 166, at 21-22.

193. Id. at 22.
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III. A GLANCE TO THE FUTURE: RAMIFICATIONS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Even after conflicts in the former Yugoslavia began to dissipate, rape continued to be a significant component of violent
political strife and guerrilla warfare in such contexts as the
Rwandan civil war, the ethnic violence in Liberia, the violent
conflict attending Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, and the
extended internal conflict in Peru. 9 4 Advancing international
law principles used to prosecute mass rape therefore continues
to be a necessary and important enterprise. Even as the opportunities for using conspiracy in ICTY rape prosecutions begin to
fade as the tribunal pushes to finish its work, 195 innovations
concerning the joinder of conspiracy and sex crime prohibitions
hold continuing relevance for the work of the ICC and other
enterprises developed for combating international crime.
Opportunities within the ICC are particularly important, given
the tribunal's worldwide support and its close link with the
jurisprudence of the ICTY. Both scholarship 96 and ICTY opinions 19 7 note the lineage the ICC owes to the ICTY's treatment of
194. See Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 326, 327 (1994) (reviewing the recent history of
rape and violent sexual abuse of women in armed conflict).
195. The reasons for this push are myriad, including the expense of the tribunal and concern for speedy trial privileges of the accused. See Patricia M.
Wald, To "EstablishIncredible Events by Credible Evidence": The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 535, 536 (2001) (citing concerns with expense, emergence of ICC,
and speedy trial); Rosemary Bennett & Carola Hoyos, US Launches Campaign
to Close UN Criminal Tribunals,FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at 10 (quoting the
United States ambassador as stating that the tribunal has been too slow and
inefficient); Colum Lynch, U.S. Seeks End to War Crimes Tribunals by 2008,
WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at A19 (reporting on statements by the United
States ambassador-at-large for war crimes urging closing of the tribunal by
2008). One innovation making it problematic for the ICTY to use conspiracy in
connection with rape prosecutions is an increased reliance on written evidence. Wald, supra, at 536-37 (reporting that the ICTY is making much
greater use of written testimony). This practice may not be amenable to the
complex proof requirements in a conspiracy trial. Cf. Albert J. Harno, Intent in
Criminal Conspiracy, U. PA. L. REV. 624, 631 (1941) (describing the complexity of intent issues in proving conspiracy).
196. See, e.g., Nicole Eva Erb, Gender Based Crimes Under the Draft Statute of the Permanent InternationalCriminal Court, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 401, 432 (1998) (describing the relationship between the treatment of
rape in the ICTY statute and in the ICC statute).
197. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, para. 117
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 21, 2000) (cit-
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rape and co-perpetrator liability. The specific provisions in the
ICC statute relevant to prosecutions for conspiracy to commit
rape as well as strengths, weaknesses, and ambiguities in the
statute's structure pertinent to such prosecutions are outlined
below.
A. ICC: STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING RAPE
AND CO-PERPETRATOR LIABILITY

Unlike the ICTY statute, which does not explicitly proscribe rape or related crimes, the statute of the International
Criminal Court enumerates sex crimes. The crimes are listed
explicitly in articles of the ICC statute governing both crimes
against humanity and war crimes. The inhumane acts listed in
Article 7 include not only "rape," but also "sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity."' 9
The war crimes section, Article 8, proscribes these same acts. 99
Sex crimes are also implicit in the more general defined crimes
of torture and inhumane treatment 2°0 and the crime of genocide.2° '
Advocates for women also point to an interpretation provision in Article 21 as another potential source of protections for
women. Under this provision, which makes special citation to
gender issues, the ICC must interpret all its laws in accordance
with existing internationally recognized human rights.0 2 The
ing the Rome statute for guidance on the issue of co-perpetrator liability for
torture), at http://www.un.ord/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/furaj00721e.
pdf.
198. Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1)(g).
199. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii). The list of sexual offenses was developed in the
context of war crimes negotiations and then repeated for the final version of
the article pertaining to crimes against humanity. Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79,
100 n.6 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (recounting the negotiation history).

200. Hebel & Robinson, supra note 199, at 117.
201. Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 6; see also Boon, supra note 7, at
636 (observing that a footnote to Article 6(b) on genocide in the ICC statute
recognizes the link between genocide and rape made by the Rwandan tribunal). Article 6(b) provides simply: "For the purpose of this statute, 'genocide'
means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: ...[ciausing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group." Rome Statute, supra
note 135, art. 6(b).
202. This section provides in full that:
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article
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Article 21 provision arguably grants license to the ICC for
interpreting crime definitions expansively in light of gender
concerns and condemned activities from other international
conventions. 203
The ICC provisions governing co-perpetrator liability do
not clearly grant authority to prosecute conspiracies. Article 25
contains provisions creating liability for committing a crime
individually or jointly; ordering, soliciting, or inducing "the
commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted"; and aiding, abetting, or otherwise assisting in the
commission of a crime "or its attempted commission, including
providing the means for its commission."2 °4 The provision that
comes closest to authorizing prosecution for conspiracy is
Section 3(d) of Article 25. According to this section, a person is
criminally responsible if that person "contributes to the commission or attempted commission of... a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose." 2 5 For liability to

attach, such contribution must be intentional and shall either:
(a) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit
the crime.' °6

The other relevant group of provisions, which appear separately in Article 28, provide for command responsibility. Article
28 states that a "military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for
crimes.., committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control."20 7 Liabil-

ity attaches where that person "knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes" and that person
"failed to take all necessary steps and reasonable measures ...
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and
be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national ethnic or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status.
Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 21(3).
203. See, e.g., Lehr-Lehrnardt, supra note 162, at 341-42 (noting the
importance of the Article 21 provision to women's groups).
204. Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 25(3)(a)-(c).
205. Id. art. 25(3)(d).
206. Id.
207. Id. art. 28(1).
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to prevent.., the crimes" or to "submit the matter to competent authorities."2 °8 Pursuant to this article, other superiors
(i.e., civilians) may bear liability for the acts of subordinates if:
(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes;
(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and
(c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.9

B. ICC: QUALITIES RELEVANT TO RAPE CONSPIRACY
PROSECUTIONS

1. Uncertainties About Command Responsibility
and Joint Enterprise Liability
Uncertainties and possible failures of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise prosecutions under the
ICTY have both legal and practical roots. Prosecutors have little reason to believe they can avoid the practical problems
encountered under the ICC scheme as well. War criminals will
not likely return to the days of detailed documentation and
clear lines of authority exposed at Nuremberg.
Legal materials do not establish definitively whether the
ICC will entertain joint criminal enterprise liability theories
similar to those pursued under the ICTY. If the tribunal follows
ICTY precedent, ICC prosecutors may pursue joint enterprise
prosecutions under the language of Article 25 providing for
liability where a person contributes to a crime "by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose." 21° Significant authority
suggests that this language owes its lineage to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings21'
rather than any ICTY materials.2 12 Nevertheless, ICTY inter208. Id. art. 28(1)(a)-(b).
209. Id. art. 28(2)(a)-(c).
210. Id. art. 25(3)(d).
211. For information on the Convention, see International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 152, art. 2(3)(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1998) [hereinafter International Convention], available at http://odsddsny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n98/761/
17pdf/n9876117.pdf.
212. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
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pretations should be relevant because the ICTY at one time
used the term "common purpose liability",13 and later used
similar language in enunciating the actus reus elements of joint
criminal enterprise liability: a "plurality of persons"; the "existence of a common plan," which amounts to or involves the
commission of the underlying crimes; and "[p]articipation in
the execution of the common plan."214 Even if the ICC language
does embrace joint criminal enterprise liability, that theory
may have limited use for ICC prosecutors pursuing group rape
convictions. Indeed, ICC authority for joint enterprise liability
would not obviate the proof problems encountered in the ICTY
when prosecutors used the theory to prosecute individuals
involved in systematic rape campaigns.
While the command responsibility provisions in the ICC
statute are more explicit than joint criminal enterprise concepts, legal analysis of the command responsibility provisions
also exposes limitations for prosecutors seeking culpability for
group rape. First, the statute's requirement that officials exercise "effective command" or "effective authority" appears to
limit criminal liability to those "who possess the material
capacity to control troops."2 15 Likewise, the ICC imposes liability on "civilian 'superiors' for the acts of their subordinates"
over whom they exercise "effective authority and control," again
apparently restricting liability to circumstances where prosecu-

Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 36-37 (1999) (explaining the connection
between the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 2(3)(c) and the ICC section); Per Saland, InternationalCriminal Law
Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE 189, 199-200 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (reporting on the connection between the two provisions). See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying
text for further discussion of this issue.
213. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 613 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001), at http://www.un.
orglicty/krstic/trialceijudgement/krs-tjOlO8l2e.pdf. Early ICTY cases used the
term "common purpose" liability, but subsequently dropped the moniker in
favor of "joint enterprise liability." Id. at para. 613 n.1366 (stating that the
language "joint enterprise liability" is preferred to "common purpose liability")
(citing Prosecutor v. Brdjamin, Case No. IT-99-36, para. 37 (Int'l Crim/ Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber June 26, 2001), at http://www.un.org/
icty/brdjanin/trialcdecision-e/10626FI225879.htm).
214. Id. at para. 611 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para.
227 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999),
at http://www.un.orclicty/tadiclappeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf). For further discussion of this standard, see supra notes 29-53 and accompanying
text.
215. Lippman, supra note 67, at 86 (interpreting Article 28 of the ICC).
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tors have proof of formal influence and demonstrable ability to
control
Although the matter has prompted
d
211subordinates."'
debate, these provisions suggest an intent to circumscribe the
reach of liability for command responsibility. Moreover, given
the complementarity theory behind ICC jurisdiction, the general tendency among domestic courts to interpret the scope of
command liability narrowly will reinforce the restrictions on
criminal liability for those in leadership positions.21
For these reasons, one would expect joint enterprise liability and command responsibility to provide limited use for
prosecutors pursuing rape convictions. The ICC would likely
benefit from a supplemental theory such as conspiracy to allow
prosecution of individuals involved in group criminality.
2. Uncertainties About Conspiracy Prosecutions
As with the ICTY, the ICC faces uncertainty about
whether its statute authorizes conspiracy prosecutions. The
version of the ICC statute presently in force mentions neither
the word conspiracy nor the concept of an agreement to commit
a crime. If authorized by the statute, conspiracy most likely is
implicit in the co-perpetrator liability concept of Article 25,

Section 3(d). 21 9 At least one commentator argues that the stat-

ute envisions liability for conspiracy. 220 Given the ICTY's influ-

216. Id. at 88. Critics maintain that this command responsibility standard
"may weaken the reach of the doctrine for civilian superiors." Vetter, supra
note 71, at 93. Vetter also enumerates reasons why weakening civilian command responsibility is undesirable. Id. (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES, pt. V (1998),
available at http://www.igc.orglicc/html/n.g.o.html).
217. Gurul6, supra note 164, at 40-43 (reading the ICC command responsibility provisions in light of ICTY and ICTR cases and arguing that the statute "dramatically reduces the burden of proof' for command responsibility and
makes possible the conviction of civilians who have "the ability to influence
others to prevent criminal activity" and "fail to do so").
218. Jordan Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nuremberg: Crimes
Against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and National Fora, 12 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 547, 565-66 (1995) (discussing cases from Canada and the
United States where courts apparently strayed from international law principles in order to absolve officers from command responsibility).
219. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text for the text of this
provision.
220. See William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof
Structural Pillarsfor the InternationalCriminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.
J. 477, 485 (1999) (stating that the "ICC Statute provides for inchoate
offenses, including several forms of vicarious liability (e.g., command responsibility, solicitation, and incitement of genocide) as well as standard attempt,
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ence on the ICC's development, one could argue that the ICTY
statute may authorize conspiracy prosecutions. Countervailing
evidence, however, clouds the issue.
The link between ICTY decisions and the ICC statute's reference to "common purpose" liability is weakened by materials
showing that the ICC drafters borrowed the term from the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings. 221' That convention apparently adopted the language

from a European
Union extraditionJ.treaty,
breath wuldfaciitat
222anticipating that its
breadth would facilitate prosecutions.
At least one report
explained that the International Terrorist Bombing Convention's language provided a ready compromise, which avoided
controversy between common law and civil law countries over
including a crime of conspiracy in the convention.
Highlight
ing the effect of this type of concerted ambiguity in the ICC
context, other commentators have noted the difficulties this
creates in determining whether the statute authorizes prosecutions for conspiracy and other crimes.224
conspiracy, and aiding and abetting theories").
221. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. The relevant provision in
the Terrorist Bombing Convention provides that:
3. Any person.., commits an offense if that person:
(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution
shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.
International Convention, supra note 211, art. 2(3)(c) (explaining the connection between the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, art.2(3)(c) and the ICC section); see also Saland, supra note 212, at
199 (reporting on the connection between the two provisions).
222. See Arsanjani, supra note 212, at 36-37; Samuel Witten, The International Convention for the Suppression of TerroristBombings, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
774, 776 (1998) (anticipating that the broad scope of Terrorism Convention
language would facilitate prosecution).
223. See Saland, supra note 212, at 199 (reporting that conspiracy was "a
concept strongly advocated by common law countries but unknown in some
civil law systems").
224. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Note, Rethinking Genocidal Intent:
The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation,99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2284
(1999) (analyzing whether Article 25(3)(d) is open to a broad, conspiracy standard); see also Panel, The International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspectives and Prospectsfor Ratification, 16 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 505, 541
(2000) (observing that the ICC statute was typical of multilateral treaty negotiations in that ambiguous wording on substantive aspects of crimes served "to
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Documentary materials created as the ICC statute
devel225
oped are also
the isueofconspiracy.
issue of c
.
ope ambiguous
ar
mbiuos
aso
oon th
Perhaps
most difficult to interpret is the fact that conspiracy appeared
(either by explicit name or by description) in early versions of
the statute, but vanished from later versions. Significantly, one
proposal for the statute included a detailed multipart provision
for a crime of conspiracy. 226 Also relevant is that early in the
development of an international criminal court, the Draft Convention on the Establishment of an International Penal Tribunal for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and Other International Crimes also provided for
facilitate compromise, allowing each part that has a concern over a particular
issue to interpret terminology in the way that benefits their side").
225. See Proceedings of the PreparatoryCommission at Its Eighth Session
(24 September-5 October 2001), U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 8th Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.3/Rev.1,
13 (2001) (including the term "conspiracy" in one of the proposed definitions of
the
crime
of
aggression),
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
prepcomm/eighth.htm; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at
59, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1996), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 117, at 489
(listing "conspiracy/complot" as an item to be discussed); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FACT SHEET 3:
PROSECUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (Jan. 8, 2000) (observing that conspiracy to commit genocide is not expressly defined as a crime under the Statute),
available at; http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/factsheets; AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MAKING THE RIGHT
CHOICES, pt. 1, § VI(D) (Jan. 1, 1997) (arguing that although the common law
concept of conspiracy as a crime is foreign to some national legal systems, the
crime is well recognized under international law and should be included in the
ICC statute as a means to prosecute persons who conspire to commit genocide
and other crimes against humanity or serious violations of humanitarian law),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGIOR40001997.
226. The proposal provided as follows:
1. A person is criminally responsible and is liable for punishment for
conspiracy if that person, [with the intent to commit a specific crime]
agrees with one or more persons to perpetrate that crime [or that a
common intention to commit a crime will be carried out] and an overt
act is committed by that person [or by another party to the agreement] [for the purpose of furthering the agreement] [that manifests
the intent].
2. A person is guilty of conspiracy even if the object of the conspiracy
is impossible or is prevented by a fortuitous event.
3. A person shall only be criminally responsible for conspiracy in
respect of a crime where so provided in this Statute.
4. A person who is criminally responsible for conspiracy is liable for
the same punishment as the person who committed or would have
committed the crime as a principal.
Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, at 94-95, U.N. Doc.
A/51122 (1996), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 117, at 489.
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conspiracy, defined as follows: "A person commits conspiracy
when, with intent to commit a specific offence, he agrees with
another to the commission of that offence and one of the members of the conspiracy commits an overt act in furtherance of
the agreement., 227 Discussion of this proposal within the United
Nations documents notes that negotiators encountered "conceptual differences concerning conspiracy among ... different legal
systems."2 28 Views on the question ranged from those who questioned whether the crime might be reserved for "exceptionally
serious crimes" to those who believed that it would be "retrogressive not to include" the crime of conspiracy because it was a
form of liability at the Nuremberg trials. 2" For the most part,
however, the concerns focused on fine points of when conspiratorial liability should attach rather than the question whether
the statute should proscribe conspiracy.230
Later in its development, the draft ICC statute described
the crime of conspiracy without mentioning it by name. Specifically, the draft statute authorized criminal responsibility if a
person "agrees with another person or persons that ...a crime

be committed and an overt act in the furtherance of the agreement is committed by any of these persons that manifests their
227. Study of the Ways and Means of Ensuring the Implementation of
InternationalInstruments Such as the InternationalConvention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Including the Establishment of the International Jurisdiction Envisaged by the Convention, U.N.
ESCOR, at 35, 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411426 (1981), reprinted in BASsIoUNI,
supra note 117, at 697, 725.
228. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 117, at 490.
229. Id.
230. For example, the negotiators queried whether the crime of conspiracy
would ever merge with a completed crime. Id. Other questions about conspiracy appearing in the background materials included:
(a) whether the accused conspirator must have an intent to commit
the crime or whether it is sufficient that there is an intention that a
crime be carried out and that others might be the actual committers;
(b) whether the accused conspirator must commit the overt act or
whether it is sufficient if one of the other co-conspirators commits the
overt act;
(c) what must be the nature of the overt act (e.g. the act is undertaken
for the purpose of furthering the agreement or must it actually manifest the agreement);
(d) whether a conspiracy exists even if the object of the conspiracy is
factually impossible to achieve;
(e) whether conspiracy should be limited in respect of an agreement to
commit certain listed crimes; and
(f) the appropriate punishment for the crime.
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intent." 231 M. Cherif Bassiouni reports that "[tihe inclusion of

this paragraph gave rise to divergent views."2 2 Accordingly, it
was after this draft that negotiators omitted any mention of the
crime in the ICC.
One may interpret these events by attributing to the drafters a pragmatic judgment made necessary by the many uncertainties and disagreements surrounding the ICC's development. In light of these difficulties, the drafters may have
chosen to sacrifice clear authorization for conspiracy prosecutions in the interest of completing the enterprise. In other
words, by avoiding the word conspiracy, the drafters increased
the likelihood that the ICC would become a reality, yet left
open the possibility that prosecutors may pursue conspiracy
convictions under the more oblique version of co-perpetrator
liability that currently appears in the statute.
Consistent with this theory, one could argue that judges
interpreting the ICC statute may appropriately read conspiracy
into the statute.238 The ICTY's expansive reading of
co-perpetrator liability and articulation of the contours of the
joint criminal enterprise theory provides precedent for such an
approach. Moreover, the admonition in Article 21 that interpretation of ICC law must be "consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender"234 provides further foundation for imputing a crime of conspiracy to commit rape. Because
conspiracy appears in many international human rights materials and the world community condemns systematic rape as a
jus cogens crime, 235 one may argue that the joinder of rape and
conspiracy is well rooted in the landscape of customary international law.
The ICC statute's strong articulation of nullem crimen sine
lege in Article 22, however, weighs against a conclusion that
231. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee in Its Session Held
from 11 to 21 February, U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, at 22
(1998), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 117, at 369, 379.
232. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 117, at 379 n.l (editor's footnote).
233. Lietzau, supra note 220, at 481 (observing that many delegations to
the ICC negotiations argued that, as with the ICTY, judges should address
any problems arising from ambiguities in the statute).
234. Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 21(3).
235. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 136, at 677, 691 (observing that enforced
sexual slavery violated a jus cogens norm of international law as it existed
during World War II).
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ICC prosecutors are free to pursue rape conspiracy convictions.
Article 22(1) provides that "[a] person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of this Court." 236 Perhaps more problematic for our purposes, Article 22(2) provides: "The definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case
of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor of the
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted."237 While
the arguments against a nullem crimen sine lege obstacle to
conspiracy prosecutions under the ICTY apply with equal force
for the ICC, the strength of the prohibition in Article 22 and
the rule of lenity generally invoked in criminal contexts suggest
the wisdom of persuading the Assembly of State Parties to the
ICC statute to make explicit that the statute encompasses the
crime of conspiracy.2 38 To follow this route would not only clarify the nullem crimen sine lege issue, but would also allow
statutory drafters to resolve matters raised earlier in ICC negotiations, such as the necessity for proving an overt act, the
intent requirements for conspiracy, the nature of crimes with
which conspiracy may be combined, the appropriate punish2 9
ment for conspiracy,
and whether to confine conspiracy to
S
2403
certain perpetrators.
CONCLUSION
In international criminal law, history testifies that each
new tribunal improves on the previous. At Nuremberg, the
prosecutor did not want to burden the court with the grim
details of the rapes that occurred. The ICTY statute specifically
mentioned rape in the section defining crimes against humanity.24' The Rwanda statute goes further, mentioning rape twice,

236. Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 22(1).
237. Id.
238. Cf.Lietzau, supra note 220, at 480-84 (noting a conflict between the
Statute's imprecise treatment of offenses and the principle of nullem crimen
sine lege articulated in Article 22).
239. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
240. For an analysis of how conspiracy standards may be overbroad in
application, see Greenawalt, supra note 224, at 2284 (arguing that if the ICC
constructs the provision to cover subordinate perpetrators, it will face "difficult
questions regarding how to place principled limitations on the potential scope
of liability" and may inappropriately "extend the liability of particular contributors to the entire genocidal campaign").
241. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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once in Article 4(e), enumerating rape and enforced prostitution
as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and again in
Article 3(g), condemning rape as a crime against humanity. 242
The ICTY developed evidentiary rules, victim protections, and
other procedural mechanisms that substantially advanced the
efficacy of rape prosecutions. 243 By pursuing the crime of

conspiracy to rape, ICTY and ICC prosecutors would continue
this trajectory of advancing international justice.
Without conspiracy theory, prosecutors miss an entire
category of potential defendants. The experience in the Balkans
illustrates the many substantial practical obstacles that stand
between indictment and actual arrest, and the importance of
broadening the candidates for successful prosecution if a tribunal is to satisfy its mission of bringing closure to conflict and
punishing guilty offenders. As former ICTY Prosecutor Richard
Goldstone stated: "[I]f there is no justice, there is no hope of
reconciliation or forgiveness because these people do not know
who[m] to forgive. People in that situation end up taking the
law into their own hands, and that is the beginning of the next
cycle of violence."244
In contributing to the retribution and deterrence goals of
international criminal tribunals, conspiracy prosecutions promise more than merely increasing the numbers of convictions.
Conspiracy is a theory that can bring leaders to justice for
organizing and inspiring criminal activity. In addition, the
crime of conspiracy recognizes the special dangers of joint
action, allowing the sweep of prosecution to focus on group
criminality, which is often more potent and effective than individual wrongdoing. Unlike some other forms of co-perpetrator
liability, however, conspiracy requires individual culpability.
It is particularly important that tribunals such as the
ICTY and the ICC experiment with new approaches in order to
expand the effectiveness of international criminal law. These
tribunals are poised to advance and refine the law more quickly
than treaty drafters and negotiators, on whom the task of

242. Rwanda Statute, supra note 116, arts. 3-4; see also Nahapetian, supra
note 22, at 133-34.
243. See generally Aolain, supra note 162, at 883, 902.
244. Goldstone, supra note 92, at 258.
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refining the conspiracy theory would otherwise rest were it not
for flexibility by judges and prosecutors.245

245. Developments, supra note 12, at 1977 (reasoning that the absence of
an "international legislature" leaves humanitarian law dependent on "painstakingly negotiated treaties and judicial interpretations of customary international law," and that "tribunals amenable to flexible interpretation may be
able to advance the law more quickly than the convention process permits").

